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 Chapter 1 Introduction
In this decade, the pension fund industry has experienced two "perfect storms" with both
interest rates and stock prices falling dramatically at the same time. Falling interest rates
increase values of pension liabilities. Falling equity prices decrease investment return of
pension funds. Both sides of their balance sheets are hit hard by bad news from the
￿nancial market. Figure 1 shows the S&P 500 index and the U.S. 10-year government
bond yield from 1998 to May 2009. The ￿rst storm happens at around 2003 and 2004.
At the end of 2000, the yield of the U.S. 10-year government bond is above 6%. The
yield reduced to about 3-4% in 2003 and 2004. During the same time period, the S&P
500 index drops to 1200 in 2003 from above 2000 at the beginning of this decade. As a
result of the ￿perfect storm￿ , the total amount of pension plan underfunding in the U.S.
is about $354 billion in 2004 increasing from $20 billion in 2000, as indicated in table 1.
In 2009, the pension industry is hit by another "perfect storm", where the S&P 500 index
drops to about 1300 and the 10-year government bond yield is as low as 3%. The ageing
population and the ￿nancial market turmoil create enormous challenges to pension funds
all over the world.
This thesis focuses on the three major participants in pension ￿nance, namely, pension
funds, individuals, and sponsoring companies. In the light of the fragile ￿nancial market
performance, prudential regulatory rules, including Value-at-Risk (VaR) constraints, are
imposed widely all over the world. The purpose of these regulations is to reduce the risk
of pension funds and protect pension fund participants. There are no doubts that these
regulations will re-shape pension funds￿investment strategies. Chapter 2 investigates
the optimal investment strategies of a pension fund under the VaR constraint. De￿ned
Bene￿t and De￿ned Contribution are the two most common types of pension plans.
Individuals with De￿ned Contributions (DC) pension plan1 get a lump sum when they
retire. They can then decide whether and when to annuitize the lump sum. The annuity
income depends on the size of the pension wealth and the interest rate at the annuitization
time. Chapter 3 analyzes retirement timing decisions of DC pension plan participants,
taking into account the optimal annuitization timing decision. Companies sponsoring
underfunded plans are typically required by law to make additional ￿nancial contributions
to close the funding gap. In the midst of a ￿nancial crisis, mandatory contributions will
severely tighten ￿nancial constraints of sponsoring companies. Chapter 4 develops an
optimal investment strategy for a company sponsoring an under-funded pension plan
1In Australia, individuals with De￿ned Bene￿t (DB) pension plans will also get a lump sum when
they retire.
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Figure 1: The upper panel of this ￿gure shows the S&P 500 index during 1998 and May
2009. The lower panel of this ￿gure shows the U.S. 10-year government bond yield of the
same period. Source: Datastream.
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Number of Underfunded 221 747 1058 1051 1108
pension Plans
Pension Underfunding $19.91 $110.94 $305.88 $278.99 $353.73
(Dollars in billions)
Table 1: This tables shows the summary of pension underfunding ￿ling. Source: PBGC
(2005)
with mandatory contribution requirement, aiming to reduce the impact of mandatory
contributions on ￿nancial constraints. The following paragraphs provide a more detailed
overview.
Chapter 2, Pension Fund Portfolio Wealth under Short-Term Regulation, studies eco-
nomic consequences of a misalignment in the planning horizon between an institutional
investor, for example, a pension fund, pursuing long-term investment strategies and a
regulator enforcing a Value-at-Risk (VaR) type solvency constraint on the institutional
investor on a short-term basis. The smaller the regulatory horizon the more often the
investor needs to ful￿ll the VaR constraint. However, the VaR-constrained investor is
only concerned about the probability but not the magnitude of the loss. Therefore, the
investor is willing to incur losses in compliance with the VaR constraint. For example, in
the case when the VaR horizon is as long as the investment horizon, a VaR-constrained
investor keeps the portfolio value above or at the threshold value, e.g. the value of the
liability, when the investment environment is favorable but leaves his portfolio completely
uninsured in the worst investment environment. By de￿nition, the worst investment en-
vironment occurs with probability equals to ￿ which is set by the regulator ex ante.
Chapter 2 shows that short-horizon VaR regulation can limit this moral hazard behavior
due to the minimum amount of portfolio wealth required to ful￿ll future VaR constraints.
A VaR constraint allows a small probability that a pension fund￿ s portfolio wealth falls
below its liability value, while a portfolio insurance constraint requires that probability to
be zero. Chapter 2 ￿nds that a short-term VaR constraint can have a similar impact on
a pension fund￿ s portfolio wealth as a portfolio insurance constraint. For a 100% funded
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pension plan, the loss caused by the annual VaR constraint can be as large as a 11%
reduction in its current asset value.
Chapter 2 also shows that the investment strategy of a VaR-constrained investor de-
pends on the frequency the VaR constraint is imposed. In the case when the VaR horizon
is as long as the investment horizon, the investor under a VaR constraint will ￿rst invest
in equities as much as an unconstrained investor would do. As the investment environ-
ment deteriorates, he will reduce his allocation to equities. However, as the investment
environment deteriorates even further, he starts to increase his allocation to equities be-
cause there is still a large chance he will end up in a state where the VaR constraint
is binding. When the environment becomes really bad, he behaves as if he is not con-
strained. Compared with the investment strategy of an investor with a long-term VaR
constraint, an investor with short-term VaR constraints will (1) decrease allocations to
the stock index much faster, (2) not gamble as much, and (3) invest 100% in bonds in bad
states. The last two results are due to the fact that the shorter the VaR horizon the more
binding it is and the investor has to make sure that the portfolio wealth is kept above a
certain wealth level to ful￿ll all the future VaR constraints. The minimum wealth level
also reduces room for gambling.
Chapter 3, Annuitization and Retirement Timing Decisions, analyzes retirement tim-
ing decisions of De￿ned Contribution (DC) pension plan participants, taking into account
the optimal annuitization timing decision. Individuals￿DC wealth shrinks a lot during
the current ￿nancial crisis. However, recently a survey by the Employee Bene￿t Research
Institute (EBRI) shows that there are not many persons would like to postpone their
retirement decision to accumulate more DC wealth. It might be worrying that the in-
dividuals will not have su¢ cient ￿nancial wealth to support their retirement lives. DC
pension plans generally provide a lump-sum payment at the retirement date. Individuals
typically have large freedom to decide when to annuitize their DC wealth after retirement.
This freedom allows individuals to bene￿t from better ￿nancial market performance after
retirement. Therefore, such a concern might be unnecessary.
Chapter 3 ￿rst sets up a retirement decision model and develops a forward looking
retirement likelihood measure from this model. The retirement likelihood measure de-
scribes the probability that an individual will retire within the next few years. In the
model, the individual obtains utility from leisure, labor income before retirement and
pension bene￿t after retirement. The DC pension bene￿t is the income from the annuity
which is bought at the optimal annuitization timing. And then, the retirement likelihood
measure is tested with the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) data. In or-
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der to assess the predictive power of this model, retirement likelihoods derived from the
theoretical setup are compared with retirement decisions observed at the second wave of
ELSA for a sample of individuals who were full-time employed at the time of the ￿rst
wave interviews. It turns out that the theory-motivated retirement likelihood measure is
a statistically signi￿cant predictor of actual retirement decisions. Moreover, Chapter 3
shows that the proposed retirement likelihood measure is highly correlated with observed
retirement ratios across groups of individuals de￿ned by age or wealth.
Chapter 4, Corporate Investment Strategy and Pension Underfunding Risk, discusses
the optimal investment strategy for a ￿rm sponsoring a De￿ned Bene￿t (DB) pension
plan. The proposed investment strategy will mitigate the impact of a liquidity shock
resulting from mandatory contributions to the pension plan. When pension plans are
under-funded, companies sponsoring these plans are typically required by law to make
additional ￿nancial contributions to close the funding gap. In the midst of a ￿nancial
crisis, sponsoring companies often have limited borrowing capacity. Additional contribu-
tions to pension plans can worsen the ￿nancial constraint even further. Chapter 4 shows
that the company￿ s optimal investment strategy should depend on the amount of capital
available for investment and on the initial pension funding ratio. The amount of capital
available for investment is the sum of the internal capital and the amount of capital bor-
rowed less pension contributions. Firms with lower pension funding ratio should have a
lower investment threshold value than otherwise identical ￿rms with better funded pen-
sion plans. The investment threshold value is the lowest project value above which the
￿rm will invest. The result is driven by the fact that lower pension funding ratios mean
higher expected future pension contributions and therefore lower values of waiting. The
risk that in the future the capital available for investment will be used to ￿ll the pension
funding gap decreases the value of waiting. In other words, ￿rms facing low pension
plan funding ratios invest more aggressively than otherwise identical ￿rms whose pension
funds are better funded, unless they are extremely constrained or unconstrained. Chapter
4 ￿nd that the value of the investment project can increase dramatically in response to
adopting our proposed investment strategy as compared to the optimal strategy ignoring
the pension liabilities.
5Chapter 2 Pension Fund Portfolio Wealth under Short-
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This Chapter is based on Shi and Werker (2009a).
I Introduction
This chapter investigates the economic consequences of a di⁄erence in the planning hori-
zon between an institutional investor pursuing long-term investment strategies and a
regulator enforcing solvency of the institutional investor on a short-term basis. Such
misalignment of horizons between an institutional investor and a regulator are likely to
exist in most developed ￿nancial markets and a⁄ect, for example, banks, insurance com-
panies, and pension funds. These investors are usually constrained in optimizing their
respective objective function in the sense that they have to ful￿ll restrictions imposed by
the ￿nancial markets authorities.
Consider the case of a bank operating under the regulatory rules of the Basel Com-
mittee on Bank Supervision. According to the 1996 Amendment the bank is constrained
to hold market risk capital in the magnitude of a multiple of the 10-day value-at-risk
(VaR) for the revaluation loss of the bank￿ s trading book. According to Basel II the bank
will be required to hold credit risk capital determined by 1-year default probabilities and
expected shortfalls. These regulatory horizons are likely to stand in sharp contrast with
the horizon of long-term investment projects involving payo⁄s in a more distant future
the bank has to evaluate with respect to their creditworthiness.
A second case, to which we will refer again throughout this chapter, is a pension
fund, which faces long-term pension liabilities with typical maturities of 15 years or
more under a regulatory framework which imposes short-term solvency constraints. A
recent example can be observed in the Netherlands where a pension regulatory regime
(Financieel Toetsings Kader, FTK) is e⁄ective as from January 2007. According to the
Dutch regulation, the pension funds should always keep the probability of underfunding
one year ahead below 2.5%. Other countries that adopt value-at-risk in their pension
fund regulation include Mexico and Australia.
The existence of such funding constraints can be understood in light of the recent
experience of a simultaneous decrease in pension assets due to a poor stock market per-
formance and an increase in pension liabilities due to low interest rates. For the UK,
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the Bank of England estimates the aggregate funding de￿cit of the FTSE-100 companies
reaches GBP 57 billion, or 5.7% of their aggregate market capitalization, at 31 October
2003 (BNP Paribas 2004) while for the Netherlands the average funding ratio dropped
from 130% in 2000 to 101% in 2002 (Ponds and van Riel 2007). The situation in the US is
equally alarming. The funding de￿cit in America￿ s corporate pension funds is estimated
to be 350bn USD (Jłrgensen 2007).
In this chapter we attempt to quantify the possible economic costs regulatory con-
straints create for the institutional investor. The examples above demonstrate the par-
ticular importance of VaR constraints in regulation practice despite the theoretical short-
comings of this risk measure (see Artzner et al.1999). For this reason we focus on VaR
constraints imposed by the regulator. We study the institutional investor￿ s optimal port-
folio wealth when the regulatory horizon is as long as the investment horizon and when
the regulatory horizon is shorter than the investment horizon. In the latter case, within
the investor￿ s investment horizon, there are a number of subsequent and non-overlapping
regulatory checks and the investment horizon is divided into a few equal-length sub-
periods. In general, the investor has to insure his portfolio against the bad performance
of the ￿nancial market to guarantee that (1) the current period VaR constraint is met
and (2) there is enough wealth to ful￿ll the next periods VaR constraints. To do so,
the investor has to hold more risk-free assets, thus, his ability to bene￿t from favorable
￿nancial market performance is limited. We show that more frequent regulatory checks
generate higher costs. The costs increase less for the more risk-averse investor.
This chapter is related to the literature studying the optimal portfolio trading strat-
egy under constraints. Grossman and Vila (1992) provide explicit solutions to optimal
portfolio problems containing leverage and minimum portfolio return constraints. Basak
(1995) and Grossman and Zhou (1995) focus on the impact of a speci￿c VaR constraint,
the portfolio insurance1, on asset price dynamics in a general equilibrium model. Van
Binsbergen and Brandt (2006) assess the in￿ uence of ex ante (preventive) and ex post
(punitive) risk constraints on dynamic portfolio trading strategies. Ex ante risk con-
straints include, among others, VaR and short sell constraints. Ex post risk constraints
include the loss of the investment manager￿ s personal compensation and reputation when
the portfolio wealth turns out to be low. They found that ex ante risk constraints tend
to decrease gain from dynamic investment while ex post risk constraints can be welfare
improving. We show that short-term VaR constraints, which allow a small probability
that the portfolio wealth falls below the threshold value, can have a similar impact on the
1Portfolio insurance is a special case of VaR constraint, which requires the probability that the port-
folio wealth falls below a certain threshold value to be zero.
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portfolio wealth as portfolio insurance constraints, which require 100% probability that
the portfolio wealth is above the threshold value.
Basak and Shapiro (2001) discuss the impact of the value-at-risk type regulation on
the institutional investors￿portfolio strategy. Their results show that a VaR constraint
keeps the portfolio value above or at the threshold value, e.g. the value of the liability,
when the investment environment (states of the world) is favorable but leaves his portfolio
completely uninsured in the worst states of the world. The uninsured states of world are
the worst states with probability of occurring equals to ￿: The probability is set by the
regulator. The explanation is as follows. The VaR constrained investor is only concerned
about the probability but not the magnitude of the loss. Therefore, the investor is willing
to incur losses in compliance with the VaR constraint and it is optimal for him to incur
losses in the states against which it is most expensive to insure. In Basak and Shapiro
(2001) the VaR horizon is as long as the investment horizon. We extend the Basak and
Shapiro (2001) paper by embedding subsequent and non-overlapping short-term value-at-
risk type regulations in the portfolio optimization problem. We show that more frequent
regulation can limit this moral hazard behavior due to the minimum amount of portfolio
wealth required to ful￿ll future VaR constraints.
Cuoco et al. (2008) considers the optimal trading strategy of institutional investors
under short-horizon VaR constraints assuming that the portfolio allocation over the VaR
horizon is constant. We extend Cuoco et al. (2008) by allowing for optimal and time-
varying portfolio allocation over the VaR horizon. This enables us to evaluate the cost of
VaR regulation given that the institutional investor behaves optimally.
This chapter is also related to the literature about dynamic trading strategies of
pension funds. Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997) considers an optimal asset allocation
with a power utility function in ￿nal surplus. Boulier et al. (2005) assume a constant
investment opportunity set with a risky and a risk-free asset. In their paper, the pension
plan sponsor aims to minimize the expected discounted value of future contributions over
a given horizon. Inkmann and Blake (2008) proposes a new approach to the valuation of
pension obligations taking into account the asset allocation strategy and the underfunding
risk of a pension fund. This chapter focuses on the optimal portfolio wealth of a pension
fund when the regulatory horizon is shorter than its investment horizon and evaluates
the economic cost of such regulation. Advantages of having frequent short-term VaR
constraints include, among others, smaller expected portfolio wealth losses. A complete
risk-return trade-o⁄ analysis is in our research agenda.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3
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studies the optimal portfolio wealth under VaR constraints and section 4 discusses the
economic costs of short-term value-at-risk type of regulation. Section 5 concludes.
II Financial Market And Investor Setup
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy on a ￿nite horizon [0;T] in a complete
￿nancial market: A pension fund is considered to be a typical long-term institutional
investor, maximizing expected utility of its funding ratio. There are two assets in the
￿nancial market, one is a riskless bond (cash account) and the other one is a risky stock.
The price of the riskless asset evolves as
dBt = rBtdt; with B0 = 1; (1)
where r denotes the constant risk-free rate. The price of stock, St, follows the di⁄usion
process,
dSt = (r + ￿￿)Stdt + ￿Stdwt; with S0 = 1; (2)
where wt is a standard Brownian motion, ￿ is the price of risk and ￿ is the stock volatility.
Dynamic market completeness (under no arbitrage) implies the existence of a unique state
price density process, ￿; given by
d￿t = ￿￿t [rdt + ￿dwt]:
As we assume an exogenously speci￿ed stream of liabilities2 and a ￿ at term structure,
maximizing expected utility over the ￿nal funding ratio is equivalent to maximizing ex-
pected utility of ￿nal wealth. The pension fund invests a fraction ￿t of his wealth in the
risky stock. The pension fund￿ s wealth, Wt; follows the dynamics
dWt = Wt (r + ￿t (￿ ￿ r))dt + ￿t￿Wtdwt: (3)
We will assume a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
parameter ￿. Finally, we abstract from new entitlements in the pension fund which
implies that the pension fund￿ s liabilities at time t are simply given as Lt = L0 exp(rt):
2Liabilities become endogenous when they depend on the asset allocation. This holds, for example,
when liabilities are in￿ ation indexed conditional on the pension fund￿ s funding ratio (see De Jong 2008,
and Koijen and Nijman 2006) or when liabilities are calculated by discounting future pension payments
with a default-adjusted discount rate as in Inkmann and Blake (2008).
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No Regulatory Constraints










s:t: E0 (￿TWT) ￿ ￿0W0: (5)
The solution to this problem is classical, but we provide a short recollection for expository
reasons. Following the standard Martingale method by Cox and Huang (1989), the time-T












T stands for the wealth of the pension fund at time T without regulation. The
Lagrange Multiplier ￿u solves the budget constraint ￿0W0 ￿ E0 (￿TW u
T) = 0 and equals
W
￿￿
0 eAT￿ using the constant A = r(1 ￿ ￿)=￿ + 1
2 (1 ￿ ￿)=￿2￿
2:
Without the VaR constraint, the value function at time 0 is
J
u














The supervisor imposes a VaR type constraint on the pension fund: the probability that
the funding ratio at time t + ￿ falls below one should not be larger than ￿, where ￿ is
usually a small number in the interval [0;1]. This can be formulated as
Pt (Wt+￿ < Lt+￿) ￿ ￿; t 2 [0;T];
where ￿; ￿ > 0; is the regulatory horizon set by the regulator, ￿ 2 [0;1].
In the single-constraint model, the regulatory horizon ￿ is as long as the investment
horizon. At time 0, the regulator requires that the probability of being under-funded at
time T should be smaller than ￿; say 2:5%;
P0 (WT < LT) ￿ ￿:
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In the two-constraint and the more general multi-constraint models, the investment
horizon stays the same but the regulatory horizons become shorter and shorter. For
example, in the two-constraint model, the regulatory horizon could equal half of the






PT=2 (WT < LT) ￿ ￿:
In the following part of this section, we will describe these two models in details.
Single-Constraint Model
In our single-constraint model, the regulatory horizon coincides with the investment hori-








s:t: E0 (￿TWT) ￿ ￿0W0 (6)
P0 (WT < LT) ￿ ￿: (7)
The optimal wealth at time T depends on whether the VaR constraint, P0 (WT < LT) ￿
￿; is binding or not. Since the optimal wealth without the VaR constraint, W u
T; increases
when W0 increases, the VaR constraint becomes less binding for the pension fund with
larger W0: Because log
￿T






￿T; it can be veri￿ed that when W0 ￿ ￿0; where





















the VaR constraint is not binding. In this case, the optimal wealth at time T is the same
W u
T as in the unconstrained case: Please see appendix A for the derivation of ￿0.
When the VaR constraint is binding, i.e.,W0 < ￿0; Basak and Shapiro (2001) prove
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T stands for the wealth of the pension fund at time-T under long-term regula-










￿ ￿; and y(1) ￿ 0 solves the budget







We study the optimal portfolio wealth under a continuous CRRA utility function
and a VaR constraint. The optimal portfolio wealth under a kinked utility function, for
example, a loss-aversion utility function, is very similar to the one we obtained here. The
portfolio insurance regulation provides a simple example. The problem with a continuous








s:t: E0 (￿TWT) ￿ ￿0W0 (9)
P0 (WT < LT) ￿ 0; (10)











1￿￿ WT ￿ LT
￿1 WT < LT
:







￿ if ￿T < ￿
LT if ￿ ￿ ￿T
: (12)
In the setting with a power utility function and a portfolio insurance constraint, the
regulator does not allow the portfolio wealth to be below LT: In the case with a loss-
aversion utility function, the investor is extremely unhappy when the portfolio wealth fall
below LT: Therefore, the optimal portfolio wealth under these two di⁄erent settings is
the same.
The optimal portfolio allocation at time t, 8t 2 [0;T]; is derived as follows. The
portfolio wealth at time t, W
(1)
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If we allocate ￿t to the stock index, the di⁄usion process of the portfolio wealth is (3).
Applying Ito￿ s lemma to (13), we get
dW
(1)
t = :::dt ￿
dW (1)
d￿
￿￿dwt;0 < t < T:
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(1) or ￿
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Two- and Multi-Constraint Models














PT=2 (WT < LT) ￿ ￿
E0￿TWT ￿ ￿0W0:
Our model directly embeds two VaR type constraints. We are going to use the back-
ward iterative solution procedure to ￿nd the solution of (14). The size of WT=2 will a⁄ect
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the bindingness of the VaR constraint during the next period.: However, at time T=2;
for any given WT=2; we know all possible optimal portfolio wealth at time T under the
next period VaR constraint. Therefore, there is a one-to-one relationship between the






1￿￿ which is the
expected utility over optimal portfolio wealth at time T. Thus, the dynamic programming
method is valid despite the fact that the bindingness of the next period depends on the
current wealth.
First, we solve the maximization problem in the second period, that is, [T=2;T]: The
second period problem is very similar to the single-constraint model. We assume that at
time T/2, the pension fund starts with wealth WT=2: Following the same method as in
the single-constraint model, we ￿nd the optimal wealth at time T, W
(2)
T ; and the value






: Second, we solve the maximization problem in the ￿rst
period, that is, [0;T=2]: The di⁄erence between the maximization problem in the second









which is a kinked function:
In the following part of this subsection, we are going to show the two steps in more detail.
First of all, we solve the maximization in the second period, i.e., [T=2;T]: By the law




























s:t: ET=2 (￿TWT) ￿ ￿T=2WT=2
PT=2 (WT < LT) ￿ ￿:
The optimization problem (15) is similar to the single-constraint model. When the
wealth at time T/2, WT=2; is not smaller than the threshold value, ￿T=2; the optimal
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When the wealth at time T/2 is smaller than the threshold value, the optimal portfolio
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The derivation of (18) is provided in Appendix B.
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where WT=2 is the minimal portfolio wealth required to ful￿ll the next period￿ s VaR
constraint.
The maximization problem in the ￿rst-period has one extra constraint (22). We set






LT if ￿T < ￿
T
LT if ￿
T ￿ ￿T < ￿T
(y￿T)
￿ 1
￿ if ￿T ￿ ￿T
;





￿ ￿T1￿T>￿T:: If the wealth at time T/2 is smaller than WT=2; it is not pos-
sible to ful￿ll the VaR constraint in the next period.
The Lagrange for the constrained optimization problem (19) is given by
L = y
(2)




















= 0, E01WT=2￿LT=2 =
1 ￿ ￿ and E01WT=2<WT=2 ￿ 0 = 0, respectively, with y
(2)
0 ￿ 0, y2 ￿ 0 and y3 ￿ 0:
The ￿rst two terms of (23) are constants. Thus, ￿nding a W
(2)
T=2 which maximizes the
value of (23) is equivalent to ￿nding a W ￿
T=2 which maximizes the value of the function
within E0 [￿] in (23).
We let U1 denote the part of value function above ￿T=2 and U2 denote the part below
￿T=2: Let f W1;T=2 denote the optimal wealth for the utility function U1; f W2;T=2 denote
the optimal wealth for the utility function U2. f W1;T=2 and f W2;T=2 have to satisfy the
constraints f W1;T=2 ￿ ￿T=2 and f W2;T=2 ￿ ￿T=2 respectively. We compare these two local
maxima pointwise to determine the global maximum, W
(2)
T=2. For all the ￿
0
T=2s where









; the optimal wealth at time T/2, W
(2)







































if WT=2 ￿ ￿T=2
:
Let I1j (￿) be the inverse function of U
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￿ ￿T=2; for j = 1 and
2; respectively. The portfolio wealth governed by Uj; f Wj;T=2; depends on the values of the
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if e ￿T=2;2 ￿ ￿
T=2;2
and b ￿T=2;2 ￿ ￿T=2;2;
where the Lagrange multiplier, y
(2)





For all the ￿
0
T=2s, the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/2, W
(2)
T=2; is f W1;T=2(f W2;T=2) if
f W1;T=2(f W2;T=2) gives higher objective value. The derivation of f W1;T=2; which is very similar
to that of f W2;T=2; is provided in Appendix C. The inverse of U
0
2 (￿) is done numerically.


















dWi=d￿ will be evaluated numerically.
We assume that the duration of the pension liability is 15 years and the VaR horizon
is 1 year. Therefore, over a pension fund￿ s 15-year investment horizon, there will be 15
non-overlapping VaR constraints. The value function at the end of each year is proxied
with polynomials of the portfolio wealth to reduce computational time. The other steps
to ￿nd the optimal portfolio wealth at the end of each year is similar to ones used to solve
the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/2 in the two-constraint model.
III Optimal Portfolio Wealth and Economic Cost
In this section, we analyze the portfolio wealth and the economic cost of single-, two-
and ￿fteen VaR constraints. We assume that r = 0:04; ￿ = 2:5%; ￿ = 0:2; L0 = 0:9; and
T = 15: We will estimate the economic cost of VaR regulations with di⁄erent regulatory
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horizons using the certainty equivalent loss.
The certainty equivalent loss, ce, measures the equivalent amount of wealth lost due
to the VaR regulation and is de￿ned as follows
J
￿




0 (￿) stands for the value function at time 0 without the VaR constraint, J￿
0 (W0 ￿ ce) =
(W0￿ce)1￿￿
1￿￿ exp(AT￿), and JV aR
0 (W0) is the value function with the VaR constraint.
Portfolio Wealth and Portfolio Allocation
In the single-constraint model, the portfolio wealth at time T, W
(1)
T ; is shown in (8).
Figure 1 gives an example of W
(1)
T : The state price de￿ ator, ￿T; takes di⁄erent values
in di⁄erent states of the world at time T. We use ! to indicate the states of the world,
where ! 2 ￿; and ￿ refers to the sample space. As can be seen from (8) and ￿gure 1, the
regulated pension fund￿ s optimal terminal wealth falls into three distinct regions in which
the pension fund exhibits di⁄erent investment behavior. In ￿ good￿states (￿T;! ￿ ￿), the
fund behaves as if there is no VaR constraint. In the ￿ intermediary region￿(￿ > ￿T;! > ￿),
the pension fund insures himself against loss. In the ￿ bad￿region (￿T;! ￿ ￿), the fund is
completely uninsured and incurs all the losses. The probability that the investor will end
up in a ￿ bad￿state is ￿:
Without the VaR constraint the optimal wealth at time T is (y￿T)
￿ 1
￿ which is a




￿ ￿ LT: In the ￿ good￿region










the regulator requires that the maximum probability of under-funding should set to be
￿; the pension fund manager must make sure that at time T the value of the portfolio
equals LT in some of the states where ￿T;! > ￿: Recall that the quantity ￿T;! can also be
interpreted as the marginal cost at time 0 of obtaining one additional unit of wealth in
state ! at time T. Hence, the larger the value of ￿T;! the more expensive it is to insure. In
order to limit the cost of insurance, the pension fund manager chooses to insure against




￿ ￿; and leaves the worst states uninsured.
Figure 2 shows the optimal portfolio allocation at time T/4 with a VaR constraint
in the one-constraint model. The VaR investor divides the values of the state price
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Figure 1: This ￿gure shows the optimal portfolio wealth at time T following the VaR
constraint in the single-constraint model. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%,
￿ = 0:2, LT = 0:9exp(rT), ￿ = 2, W0 = 0:81 and T = 15. The solid line represents
the optimal portfolio wealth without the VaR constraint. The dashed line represents the
optimal portfolio wealth with the VaR constraint.
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Figure 2: This ￿gure shows the optimal portfolio allocation at time T/4 following a VaR
constraint in the single-constraint model. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%,
￿ = 0:2, LT = 0:9exp(rT), ￿ = 2, W0 = 0:91 and T = 15. The pink horizontal solid
line represents the optimal portfolio allocation at time T/4 without the VaR constraint.
The red curve represents the optimal portfolio allocation with the VaR constraint (One-
Constraint Model).
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Figure 3: This ￿gure shows the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/2 following VaR
constraints in the two-constraint model. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%,
￿ = 0:2, LT = 0:9exp(rT), LT=2 = 0:9exp(0:5rT), ￿ = 2, W0 = 1, and T = 15. The red
solid line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/2 without VaR constraint. The
dotted line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/2 with two VaR constraints
(Two-Constraint Model) and the dashed line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at
time T/2 with one VaR constraint (Single-Constraint Model).
de￿ ator into three intervals. The ￿rst interval is for ￿T=4 ￿ 1; the second interval is for
1 < ￿T=4 ￿ 5:5; and the third interval is for ￿T=4 > 5:5: At time 0, the chances that
the VaR investor ends up in interval 1 at time T=4 is 72%, in interval 2 is 28%; and in
interval 3 is almost 0. Within interval 1, as the investment environment becomes worse,
the VaR investor allocates less to the stock index to ful￿ll VaR constraint at time T.
Within interval 2, the VaR investor starts to increase allocation to the stock index. At
that time, he is gambling because there is still a chance that he might end up in the
"intermediate state" at time T where the VaR constraint is binding. In interval 3, the
VaR investor behaves as if there is no VaR constraint.
In the two-constraint model, the portfolio wealth at time T has similar pattern as the
one in the single-constraint model. However, the pattern of the portfolio wealth in the
earlier period is di⁄erent. This is because at the end of the ￿rst period, the pension fund
has to make sure that there is enough money to ful￿ll the VaR constraint in the next pe-
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riod. Figure 3 shows the wealth at time T/2 in the two-constraint model, single-constraint
model and the unconstrained model. We have derived the ￿nal wealth in the one period
model in (8). The wealth in the single-constraint model before time T is derived in ap-
pendix D. As we can see from ￿gure 3, in the ￿ good￿states (low ￿T=2) the two-constraint
model generates lower wealth than the single-constraint model and the unconstrained
wealth. In the ￿ intermediate￿states, the portfolio wealth of the two-constraint model
becomes higher than that of the single-constraint model and the unconstrained model.
In the ￿ bad￿states (high ￿T=2), the portfolio wealth of the two-constraint model is always
above about 1.12. This result does not hold for the single- period and unconstrained mod-
els. The fact that the portfolio wealth of the two-constraint model is always above 1.12
is because it is not possible to ful￿ll the VaR constraint in the second period (from time
T/2 to time T) if the portfolio wealth at time T/2 is smaller than 1.12. The minimum
wealth needed to ful￿ll future VaR constraint depends on future liability values, the VaR
probability, ￿; and discounter factor. For example, if ￿ changes to 0.05, the minimum
wealth at time T/2 is 1.07 and if r changes to 5%, the minimum wealth is 1.22. ￿; pen-
sion liabilities and discount factor are assumed to be exogenous, therefore, the minimum
wealth is also exogenous. If the minimum wealth is higher (lower) than 1.12, the portfolio
wealth at ￿ good￿states will be smaller (larger) than exhibited in ￿gure 3. In order to have
better performance in the ￿ bad￿states, the pension fund with two VaR constraints has to
invest more in risk-less assets. Holding more risk-less assets reduces his ability to bene￿t
from stock price increases.
As the VaR horizon becomes shorter, the minimal portfolio wealth required to ful￿ll
all future VaR constraints increases. Eventually, when the VaR horizon is shortened to
be 1 year (15-constraint model), the minimal portfolio wealth is almost as high as the
pension liability each year (before the 14th year). For example, ￿gure 4 shows the optimal
portfolio allocation at the end of year 13, where the investment horizon is 15 years, ￿
is 2, and the regulatory horizon is 1 year. That is, at the beginning of each year before
year 14, the pension fund manager will have to make sure that the portfolio wealth at
the end of year has to be as high as the pension liability. Thus, a number of short-term
non-overlapping VaR constraints can have the same impact on the portfolio wealth as the
portfolio insurance strategy where the probability that the pension portfolio wealth falls
below the pension liability is required to be 0.
Figure 5 shows the portfolio allocation at time T/4 in one-constraint, two-constraint
and ￿fteen-constraint model. When the investment environment is favorable (￿T=4 ￿ 1),
both the two-constraint VaR investor and ￿fteen-constraint VaR investor reduce their
allocation to stock to meet their VaR constraints. When 1 < ￿T=4 ￿ 2; the two-constraint
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Figure 4: This ￿gure shows the optimal portfolio wealth at year 13 following VaR con-
straints in the ￿fteen-constraint model. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%,
￿ = 0:2, LT = 0:9exp(rT), LT=2 = 0:9exp(0:5rT), ￿ = 2, W12 = 1:48, and T = 15. The
VaR horizon is one year. The red solid line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at
year 13 without VaR constraint. The dashed line represents the optimal portfolio wealth
at year 13 with 15 VaR constraints (￿fteen-Constraint Model).
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VaR investor increases his allocation to stock. This is the gambling behavior explained
before. When ￿T=4 > 2 (at time 0, the probability that ￿T=4 > 2 is very close 0); the two-
constraint investor decreases his allocation to the stock index. Eventually, the allocation
to the stock index converges to 0. The ￿fteen-constraint VaR investor exhibits gambling
behavior at much smaller ￿
0
T=4s since for his VaR constraint is much more binding than
other investors.
Certainty Equivalent Losses
In this sub-section, we will assess the economic cost having a more frequent VaR regu-
lation. Figure 6 shows the certainty equivalent losses of single-constraint, two-constraint
and ￿fteen-constraint models when ￿ = 2: Figure 7 shows the certainty equivalent losses
for ￿ = 4: From ￿gure 6 and ￿gure 7, we can draw three main conclusions. First, the
certainty equivalent loss is increasing as the initial portfolio wealth decreases. For exam-
ple, for a pension fund with risk aversion of 2 and initial wealth of 0.91, the certainty
equivalent loss is 0.0341 for the single-constraint model. The certainty equivalent loss
decreases to 0.0069 as the initial wealth increases to 1.1. Second, the certainty equiv-
alent loss increases with the regulatory frequency. For a pension fund with ￿ = 2 and
100% funded (i.e., initial wealth equals 0.91), the certainty equivalent loss is 0.0341 for
the single-constraint model where the investment horizon is as long as the regulatory
horizon, 0.0460 for the two-constraint model where the regulatory horizon is half as long
as the investment horizon and 0.1005 for the ￿fteen-constraint model where the pension
fund faces a VaR constraint every year. That is, for a pension fund with ￿ = 2; the cost of
having annual VaR constraint equals to 11% (0.1005/0.91) reduction in its current port-
folio wealth. Third, the certainty equivalent is decreasing as the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion increases. For example, in the Fifteen-constraint model, if a pension fund has
initial wealth of 0.91 the certainty equivalent loss is 0.1005 if the fund￿ s risk aversion is 2
and 0.0464 if the fund￿ s risk aversion is 4 which equals to 5.1% of reduction in its current
asset value.
The certainty equivalent costs of a 15-constraint portfolio insurance regulation are
very similar to the 15-constraint VaR regulation. For example, for a pension fund with
gamma equals to 2 and initial wealth equals to 0.91, 0.95 and 1.0, the certainty equivalent
losses are about 10%, 7% and 6% respectively. This is not surprising since the minimum
portfolio wealth in the 15-constraint VaR model is almost as large as the liability values,
as shown in ￿gure 4. If an investor faces a continuous VaR constraint, at any point of time
except time T, his minimum portfolio wealth required to ful￿ll future VaR constraints is
higher than other investors. In the extreme case, if the investor has to invest all the time
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Figure 5: This ￿gure shows the optimal portfolio allocation at time T/4 following VaR
constraints in the one-constraint, two-constraint and ￿fteen-constraint model. The para-
meter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%, ￿ = 0:2, LT = 0:9exp(rT), LT=2 = 0:9exp(0:5rT),
￿ = 2, W0 = 1, and T = 15. The red solid line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at
time T/4 without VaR constraint. The red curve represents portfolio wealth at time T/4
with one VaR constraint (One-Constraint Model). The dotted line represents the optimal
portfolio wealth at time T/4 with two VaR constraints (Two -Constraint Model) and the
dashed line represents the optimal portfolio wealth at time T/4 with 15 VaR constraints
(Fifteen-Constraint Model).
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Figure 6: This ￿gure shows the certainty equivalent loss following single, two and ￿fteen
VaR constraints for ￿ = 2. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%, ￿ = 0:2,
LT = 0:9exp(rT), LT=2 = 0:9exp(0:5rT), and the investment horizon, T; is 15 years.
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Figure 7: This ￿gure shows the certainty equivalent loss following single, two and ￿fteen
VaR constraints for ￿ = 4. The parameter values are r = 0:04, ￿ = 2:5%, ￿ = 0:2,
LT = 0:9exp(rT), LT=2 = 0:9exp(0:5rT), and the investment horizon, T; is 15 years.
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in bonds, the certainty equivalent loss is 14% of his initial wealth for an investor with
￿ = 2.
IV Conclusions
The value-at-risk type constraint is often adopted by regulators to limit the portfolio risk
of institutional investors. However, the regulatory horizon is usually much shorter than
the institutional investors￿investment horizon. We study three models with di⁄erent
regulatory horizons. In our single-constraint model, the regulatory horizon is as long as
the investment horizon. In our two-constraint model, the regulatory horizon is half as long
as the investment horizon. Thus, the investor faces two subsequent and non-overlapping
regulatory constraints within his investment horizon. In the ￿fteen-constraint model,
the investor faces a VaR constraint every year over his 15-year investment horizon. We
￿nd that in the multi- constraint model the investor invests more in the risk-free asset
than the single-constraint model. Shorter regulatory constraint, on one hand, enables
the pension fund to avoid large losses when the investment environment worsens but,
on the other hand, also limits the pension fund ability to bene￿t from an increase in
stock prices. We show that the economic cost increases with the regulatory frequency
but it increases less for the more risk-averse investor. For a 100% funded pension fund,
the cost brought by the annual VaR constraint can be as large as 10% reduction in its
current asset value. Pension funds could face instantaneous liquidation resulting from
unfavorable ￿nancial performances. The liquidation of pension funds will push the world
into a deeper recession. Therefore, even though short horizon VaR constraint is restrictive
in portfolio allocation, but such a regulation is necessary since it reduces the discontinuity
risk dramatically.
Appendix
A The Deviation of ￿0
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with ￿0 = 1 and wT ￿ w0 s N (0;T ￿ 0): Assuming that P0 (W u






























The inequality arises because wT￿w0 is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance
T ￿ 0: From (A1), we can obtain the threshold value, ￿0; and















2 (T ￿ 0)
1
￿
+ A(T ￿ 0)
￿
:
As soon as W0 ￿ ￿0; the VaR constraint is not binding:






When the VaR constraint is binding, the optimal wealth at time T is shown in (16) and














































































2 (T ￿ T=2); therefore
￿T = ￿T=2e
YT￿T=2






2 (T ￿ T=2)
￿
:
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The inequality, ￿T ￿ ￿





























































































































































































With similar steps, we can also derive the second and third terms of (A2):
C The Derivation of f W1;T=2
The procedure to ￿nd f W1;T=2 is as follows. f W1;T=2 is the solution of







￿ y￿T=2WT=2 + y21WT=2￿LT=2 ￿ y31WT=2<WT=2 ￿ y41WT=2￿￿T=2
o
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y3 = 1; y4 = 1 and I1 (￿) is the inverse function of U1 (￿): The function on which maxf￿g





LT=2; ￿T=2 and WT=2: Let L denote the function on which maxf￿g operates. Since ￿T=2
is the amount of wealth above which the VaR constraint is not binding and WT=2 is the
amount of wealth below which the VaR constraint can never be ful￿lled, ￿T=2 will not be















because f W1;T=2 has to be larger than or








































Case 1: ￿T=2 ￿ LT=2















is a strictly decreasing function of ￿T=2: And






< ￿T=2: For all ￿
0
T=2s which are not larger than e ￿
(2)
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￿ y￿T=2￿T=2 + y2:
For simplicity we use y to represent y
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is larger than 0 for all ￿T=2 ￿ e ￿
(2)
T=2. Therefore, when
￿T=2 > LT=2 and ￿T=2 ￿ e ￿
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When ￿T=2 > LT=2 and ￿T=2 > e ￿
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< ￿T=2 8￿T=2 > e ￿
(2)
T=2: The values


























￿ y￿T=2￿T=2 + y2:










; the optimal portfolio wealth
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when ￿T=2 > LT=2 and ￿T=2 > e ￿
(2)
T=2 is ￿T=2:
Case 2: ￿T=2 < LT=2





￿T=2: When ￿T=2 < ￿
(2)














































































with respect to WT=2 evaluated at LT=2
and ￿T=2 are larger than 0 and y2 ￿ 0: So the optimal portfolio wealth governed by U1 is,




; for ￿T=2 < ￿
(2)
T=2:
To ￿nd the optimal portfolio wealth when ￿
(2)
T=2 ￿ ￿T=2 < ￿
(2)
T=2; we have to dis-
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For ￿T=2 > ￿
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Therefore, when b ￿T=2 > ￿
(2)
T=2 and ￿
T=2 ￿ ￿T=2 < ￿
(2)









































































which is smaller than 0 for
￿
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T=2 ￿ ￿T=2 < e ￿
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> 0; therefore, the optimal portfolio
wealth is ￿T=2:
U2 (￿) is also a convex function like U1 (￿): The procedure to ￿nd f W2;T=2 which is the




is, therefore, the same as the one for
f W1;T=2.
Appendix D
The time-t (t ￿ T) optimal wealth is given by
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; x = ￿ or ￿





(T ￿ t); x = ￿ or ￿
Proof. Because ￿tWt is a martingale, the wealth at time t can be written as
W









When r and ￿ are constant, conditional on the information set Ft, ln￿T is normally
distributed with mean ln￿t￿(r+ 1
2￿
2)(T ￿ t) and variance ￿
2 (T ￿ t): Inserting (8) into
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(A5) and evaluating the conditional expectations over each of the three regions of ￿T
yields
W






















Let YT￿t ￿ ￿r(T ￿ t) ￿ ￿(wT ￿ wt) ￿ 1
2￿
2 (T ￿ t); therefore
￿T = ￿te
YT￿t
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Let H (T ￿ t) = Z + 1
￿￿
p





















































; x = ￿ or ￿








































With the same method, we can also prove the remaining two terms of (A4).
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I Introduction
In recent years, there has been a signi￿cant shift from De￿ned Bene￿t (DB) to De￿ned
Contribution (DC) pension plans in a number of countries, including the U.S., the U.K.
and Australia. In the U.S., the number of DB plans has declined sharply in recent years,
from 112,208 in 1985 to about 29,600 in 2004 (FDIC 2006). In the U.K., DC plans started
widely about two decades ago. At 2002, approximately a third of pension schemes in the
U.K. are DC and the trend away from DB funds is expected to accelerate in coming
years (Ross and Wills 2002). This shift makes it increasingly interesting to understand
determinants of DC pension plan participants￿retirement decisions.
Retirement decisions of individuals with DC plans are jointly in￿ uenced by many fac-
tors, for example, expected and realized investment returns, the individuals￿risk aversion,
the mortality rate, the subjective valuation of leisure, the labor income and its expected
growth rate. DC pension plans generally provide bene￿t in the form of a lump-sum pay-
ment. In some countries, for example, the U.S., there are no obligations to annuitize DC
wealth, while in others, for example, the U.K., there are obligations to do so. The semi-
nal paper of Yaari (1965) argues that, in the absence of a bequest motive, all retirement
wealth of risk-averse individuals should be annuitized1. There are two reasons support-
ing this view. One is that without annuitization there is a risk that the retirees might
consume too much so that they will exhaust their retirement resource before they die.
The other one is that some retirees might consume too less while they are alive. These
individuals could have consumed more to have better life quality. Thus, an important
part of annual DC pension income should be annuity income, especially in countries, like
the U.K., where there are obligations to annuitize DC wealth.
According to the 2009 Retirement Con￿dence Survey conducted by the Employee
Bene￿t Research Institute (EBRI), about half of workers in the U.S. still would like to
retire no later than age 65 despite the recent ￿nancial crisis. In the U.K., the average
retirement age for men (women) was about 65 (62) in 2008, increasing from 64 (61) in
1The voluntary annuitization participation rate is very low which is referred to as the annuity puzzle.
The desire to annuitize might be weakened by, among others, bequest motive, irreversibility of annuitiza-
tion decision, precautionary savings over unexpected spending boost (for example, medical expenditure).
But in a country like the U.K. where the ￿rst-pillar State Pension is low, annuitizing the pension wealth
accumulated through the employer-sponsored scheme could provide safety net for retirement income.
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1984. Since workers￿DC wealth shrinks dramatically during the crisis, the fact that they
do not want to prolong their working lives raises concern that they will not have su¢ cient
￿nancial wealth to support their retirement lives. However, individuals typically have
large freedom to decide when to annuitize their DC wealth after retirement. This freedom
allows individuals to bene￿t from better ￿nancial market performance after retirement.
Therefore, such a concern might not be necessary and it could be optimal for some
individuals to retire even when the ￿nancial market performance is sluggish because they
could continue investing their DC wealth in the ￿nancial market after retirement and
annuitize the DC wealth when the market performs better. With the annuitization timing
freedom, the decision to retire becomes a decision to optimally exercise a compound real
option. Once the individual retires, he gets the option to annuitize his DC pension wealth.
The optimal retirement decision depends on the expected outcome of the annuitization
option.
This chapter aims to analyze retirement timing decisions of DC pension plan partici-
pants, taking into account the optimal annuitization timing decision. To do so, I will ￿rst
set up a retirement decision model and develop a forward looking retirement likelihood
measure from this model. The retirement likelihood measure describes the probability
that an individual will retire within the next few years. In the model, the individual
obtains utility from leisure, labor income before retirement and pension bene￿t after re-
tirement. The DC pension bene￿t is the income from the annuity which is bought at the
optimal annuitization timing.
The retirement likelihood measure is then tested with the English Longitudinal Study
of Ageing (ELSA) data. The most important reason why I choose U.K. data is that
there is an obligation to annuitize pension wealth before age 752. ELSA is a biannual
panel survey among those aged 50 and over (and their younger partners) living in private
households in England. For all the individuals who are full-time employed in the wave
1 interviews (conducted in 2002-3), the probabilities of retiring by wave 2 interviews
(conducted in 2004-5) are evaluated based only on the information available at wave 1
interviews. The model predictions are compared with the actual retirement ratios and
the predictions implied by a Probit model where age, gender, education level and DC
wealth are explanatory variables used to explain the retirement decisions reported at the
wave 2 interviews. The performance of the retirement likelihood measure, in terms of
2The desire to annuitize voluntarily is weakened by, among others, the bequest motive, the irreversibil-
ity of annuitization decision, and precautionary savings over unexpected spending boost (for example,
medical expenditure). But in a country like the U.K. where the ￿rst-pillar State Pension is low, annu-
itizing the pension wealth accumulated through the employer-sponsored scheme provides a safety net for
the retirement income.
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the correlations with the actual retirement ratios and the roots of Mean Square Errors,
are comparable to the performance of the Probit regression. This result gives strong
support to the option model setup in this chapter because the prediction from the option
model is out of sample while the prediction from the Probit regression is in-sample. This
chapter also quanti￿es the economic bene￿ts of having annuitization timing freedom. The
economic bene￿t is de￿ned as the percentage di⁄erence between the certainty equivalent
wealth obtained from optimally choosing the annuitization time on the one hand and
annuitizing at the retirement time on the other hand. I show that annuitization timing
freedom on average leads to a gain of 1.8% for an individual which retires in one year.
This chapter is related to the literature focusing on the determinants of retirement
decisions. A ￿rst line of research in this area has investigated the retirement incentives of
DB pension plan participants. The seminal paper by Stock and Wise (1990) presents an
option value model to describe the retirement decisions of DB plan participants. Their
model is very close in spirit to the stochastic dynamic programming model of Rust (1987).
Stock and Wise (1990) apply their model to data from a large company. They ￿nd
that their model can explain very well the actual retirement ratios in that company.
They argue that pension wealth is a signi￿cant determinant of the retirement probability.
Samwick (1998) applies the option model to a national-wide dataset. His research con￿rms
and strengthens the results of Stock and Wise (1990). Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997)
link the option value to the lifetime marginal productivity schedule which, given their
assumption, is increasing at the beginning of the working life and then starts decreasing.
They argue that people will retire when the ratio of DB pension bene￿t and the current
wage reaches certain threshold value. This chapter extends the option value model of
Stock and Wise (1990) to the DC plan participants￿retirement decision.
A second line of research focuses on di⁄erences between impacts of DB and DC pension
plans on the retirement decision and pension income. Friedberg and Webb (2005) study
Health and Retirement Survey data and ￿nd that workers with DC plans are retiring
signi￿cantly later compared with the ones with DB scheme. Samwick and Skinner (2004)
investigate whether DC plans, compared to DB plans, are adequate in providing for a
comfortable retirement pension. Their results show that 401(k) plans, a popular U.S.
variant of DC plans, can be as good as or better than DB plans in providing retirement
income.
A third line of research looks at the interactions among wealth, investment strategies
and the retirement decisions. Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) and Coronado and Perozek
(2003) study the e⁄ect of a positive shock in household wealth including private savings
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and savings through DC accounts on household members￿retirement decision making.
These two papers investigate the period in the late 1990s when the stock market was
booming in the U.S.. Both papers ￿nd that the extraordinary high returns in the stock
market increase retirement in the United States. Lachance (2003), Choi and Shim (2006),
Farhi and Panageas (2007) and Liu and Neis (2002) study the issue of retirement decision
and its implication on the investment choice. Choi and Shim (2006) show that the
individual consumes less and invests more in risky assets when he has an option to retire
than he should in the absence of such an option. Farhi and Penagear (2007) ￿nd that
investing for early retirement tends to increase savings and reduce an agent￿ s e⁄ective
relative risk aversion, thus increasing his stock market exposure.
A fourth line of research investigates the interaction between the optimal retirement
age and a number of key factors like the availability of annuity products, life expectancy
and wages. Sheshinski (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis on these issues.
This chapter is also related to the literature on optimal annuitization timing. The
literature on this topic is relatively small but growing. Milevsky and Young (2002) develop
a normative model of when the individuals should annuitize their wealth. Their model
is built on Merton (1971) and solved by standard continuous-time technology. Milevsky
and Young (2007) argue that in the U.S. annuitization prior to age 65-70 is not optimal
even in the absence of any bequest motives. Milevsky, Moore and Young (2006) study the
interaction between the annuitization timing decision and the optimal portfolio allocation.
The main contribution of this chapter is to incorporate the optimal annuitization
timing decision into a normative model explaining the optimal retirement decision making
of DC plan participants. There is no doubt that the annuitization timing has large impact
on the size of the DC pension bene￿t. Therefore, rational individuals with DC plans
should take this into account while making their retirement decision. Incorporating the
optimal annuitization decision making improves the comprehensiveness of a normative
model for optimal retirement timing decision. The empirical ￿ndings of this chapter
suggest that in reality at least some individuals recognize the value of the freedom in
choosing the annuitization timing and incorporate it into their retirement decision making.
The organization of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 describes the retirement
decision model. Second 3 discusses the empirical investigation of the model prediction.
Section 4 concludes.
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II The Retirement Decision Model
The aim of this section is to model the optimal retirement decision of an individual
participating in a DC plan, taking into account the optimal annuitization timing. This
model will also account for the DB and the state pension plans existing next to the DC
pension plan. Currently, we are at time 0 and the individual￿ s current age is F, where
50 ￿ F < 75: He is working full time at time 0. He can retire between time 1, 2; 3;:::and
time T where time T is the time when this person turns 75 years old. The oldest age
the individual could reach is assumed to be Tmax and Tmax > T: His current DC wealth
is W0: The individual does not have to annuitize his retirement wealth immediately after
retirement unless he retires at time T: If he retires before time T; he could annuitize his
pension wealth between the retirement date, say t; and T:
Assume that the individual retires at time t; where t could be any time between 1
and T and annuitizes at time ta, which could be either at or between time t and T:
His subsequent pension income, P (t;ta); consists of annuity income, A(t;ta); after the
individual annuitizes his DC wealth, the amount, Q(t;ta); withdrawn from his DC wealth
before annuitization, the income from current and past DB plans, CDB (t) and PDB (t);
and the state pension, SP (t); that is,
P (t;ta)j =
(
A(t;ta) + CDB (t)j + PDB (t)j + SP (t)j ; for Tmax ￿ j ￿ ta;
Q(t;ta) + CDB (t)j + PDB (t)j + SP (t)j ; for ta > j ￿ 1;




A(t;ta); for Tmax ￿ j ￿ ta
Q(t;ta); for ta > j ￿ 1
:
For any given pairs of t and ta; Q(t;ta) is constant over time (t; ta) and A(t;ta) is
constant over time (ta; T). The DB and state pension bene￿ts, CDB (t)j ; PDB (t)j
and SP (t)j ; are indexed to in￿ ation after retirement. The pension bene￿ts, A(t;ta);
Q(t;ta); CDB (t); PDB (t) and SP (t) will be discussed below in more detail.
The Financial Market
In this section, the asset universe available to the DC pension plan member for investment
purposes will be introduced. There are one stock index and one bond available in the
￿nancial market. The di⁄usion processes of the short term interest rate and the stock
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index are as follows,
drt = ￿r (r ￿ rt)dt + ￿rdZ1t (2)
dSt = (rt + ￿s￿s)Stdt + ￿sStdZ2t; (3)
where ￿s is the Sharpe Ratio of stock price, ￿r and ￿s are volatilities of short-term interest
rate and stock price, and r is the long-term average of the short-term interest rate. The
Vasicek process (2) is mean reverting. When the short-term interest rate falls below
the long-term average, r; the short-term interest rate tends to increase towards r in the
future: When the short-term interest rate is above the long-term average, the short-term
interest rate tends to fall towards the long-term average in the future. ￿r determines the
speed of the such an adjustment process. Z1 and Z2 are two standard Brownian Motions
supported by a probability space (￿; F; P) over the ￿nite time horizon (0; T) with
correlation coe¢ cient ￿: All stochastic processes introduced in this chapter are assumed
to be measurable with respect to the augmented ￿ltration fFt : t 2 (0;T)g:
From the Vasicek model, we can get the price of the zero-coupon bond at time t with





























and ￿r is the interest rate price of risk. The yield of a zero-coupon bond with time to





By Ito￿ s lemma, the dynamics of any arbitrary bond prices can be described by
dBt = Bt [(rt + ￿r￿B;t)dt + ￿B;tdZ1t]; (6)
where ￿B;t = ￿rD(r;t) and D(r;t) = ￿(dBt=dr)=Bt is the elasticity of the bond price
with respect to the short interest rate. The elasticity is referred to as the duration of
the interest rate contingent claim. Following Munk, et al (2004), it is assumed that the
bond available for the investor has a constant duration D > 0. This can be thought of as
re￿ ecting the duration of the aggregate portfolio of bonds outstanding, or a bond index,
where bonds that expire are always substituted with new longer term bonds.
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The DC Income
As we have seen before, the DC income, DC (t;ta); consists of the amount the individ-
ual withdraw before annuitization, Q(t;ta); and annuity income after the annuitization,
A(t;ta). The DC income is jointly a⁄ected among other factors by the investment returns,
the amount of contributions made to the DC plan and the annuity rates.
Let W (t;ta)j denote the individual￿ s DC portfolio wealth at time j, j 2 [t;ta]; if
the individual retires at time t and annuitizes at time ta: Assume that the total amount
of contributions paid by the individual and his employer to the DC plan is C per year.
After retirement, the individual will withdraw Q(t;ta) per year from his DC wealth
before annuitization. A fraction ￿ of his DC assets is invested in the stock index and
1 ￿ ￿ in the bond. As in Samwick and Skinner (2003), the investment portfolio will
be rebalanced annually to keep the weight of the stock and bond at ￿ and 1 ￿ ￿. The
optimal annuitization and retirement dates will be described below. For every possible
combination of retirement and annuitization dates, that is, 0 ￿ t ￿ T and t ￿ ta ￿ T;
the individual￿ s DC wealth can be described as follows
W (t;ta)j =
8
> > > > <




















Bj; t < j ￿ ta:
(7)
The upper part of equation (7) describes the wealth process before retirement and the
lower part describes the wealth process after retirement. Before the individual retires,
the total amount of DC wealth available for investing is the sum of the previous DC
wealth and the new contribution. After the individual retires but before the individual
annuitizes his DC wealth, the total amount of DC wealth available for investing is the
di⁄erence between the previous DC wealth and the amount withdrawn by the individual.
If the individual retires at time t and annuitizes his DC wealth at time ta; the an-
nuity income, A(t;ta); which he will receive immediately after annuitization until he
dies depends, among others, on the term structure and the amount of DC wealth at the
annuitization date, ta: A(t;ta) is determined as follows,























5(1 + p): (8)
In eq.(8), p is a load factor which is greater than or equal to zero, obtaining a measure
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of the ￿money￿ s worth￿ of the annuity. If the load factor is zero, then the annuity contract
is actuarially fair and the ￿money￿ s worth￿equals one. Empirical evidence by Mitchell
et. al. (1999) illustrates that the load factor varies between 8% and 20% depending on
di⁄erent assumptions about discounting and mortality tables3. Mk denote the probability
that the individual is alive at time k, conditional on being alive at time k￿1 and M1 ￿ 1:
r
(j)
ta is the j-year interest rate at the time of annuitization.
I assume that the amount, Q(t;ta); the individual withdraws after retirement but
before annuitization equals the amount of annuity income he could get if he annuitizes
immediately after retirement, that is,
Q(t;ta) = A(t;t):
The DB and state pension incomes are introduced in the following part of this section.
The DB and State Pension Income
If the person retires at time t, where t could be any time between 1 and T, his income from
current and past DB plans, CDB (t) and PDB (t); are determined by, among others, the
accrual rate, years of membership and labor income, that is,
CDB (t) = acc_rate ￿ nt ￿ Yt (9)
PDB (t) = acc_rate ￿ npast ￿ Ylastyear ￿ exp(￿ (t ￿ tlastyear)); (10)
with tlastyear < t;
where acc_rate is the accrual rate, nt is the number of membership years in the current
DB scheme at time t, npast is the number of years in the past DB scheme, ￿ is the annual
in￿ ation rate, tlastyear is the last year in the past DB plan, Ylastyear is the individual￿ s
annual gross income during his last year in the past scheme and Yt is the person￿ s annual
gross income at time t. Thus, the DB plan is of a ￿nal salary type and the DB income
after retirement is indexed to in￿ ation which is required by law in the U.K. (see Blake
2003). This means if the individual retires at time t; his income afterwards is,
CDB (t)j = CDB (t)exp(￿ (j ￿ t)); for j = t:::Tmax;
PDB (t)j = PDB (t)exp(￿ (j ￿ t)); for j = t:::Tmax:
3Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) and Cannon and Tonks (2003) study the actuarial fairness of annuity
in the U.K.. Both papers ￿nd that the annuity is actuarially fair using annuitant mortality table.
However, Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) show that the annuity is unfairly priced using the population
mortality table. I use the population mortability table here.
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The state pension is also indexed to in￿ ation, therefore, we have
SP (t)j = SP (t)exp(￿ (j ￿ t)); for j = t:::Tmax: (11)
The Optimal Retirement and Annuitization Timing
The utility function is closely related to Stock and Wise (1990). At time 0, the individual
is full time employed. The individual can retire between time 1 and T: Looking ahead,
he will receive his labor income as long as he keeps working. Once he retires he receives
pension income and enjoys the leisure until he dies. At time t; 1 ￿ t ￿ T; if the individual
retires, his utility of retirement, Ut; is the sum of the utility from labor income, pension


















where ￿ stands for the subjective discount factor and the parameter K takes into account
the disutility of work. Ys stands for labor income which is deterministic and P (t;ta)s is
the pension income which is explained in (1).
s Y
k=t
Mk is the cumulative survival probability
from time t to s with Mt = 1: The ￿rst term of (12) is the accumulation of the utility
from labor income at time t and the second term is the sum of the discounted utility
from pension and leisure at time t: As in Stock and Wise (1990), the parameter K has
two speci￿cations. In the ￿rst speci￿cation, K is a constant. In the second speci￿cation,





where k0; k1 and k2 are
constants4.
For each of the possible retirement stopping times, the DB and state pension income
is determined by (9), (10) and (11). But as we have seen before, the DC pension in-
come, DC (t;ta); depends not only on when the individual retires but also on when DC
wealth is annuitized. This makes the retirement option a compounded real option. Once
the individual retires, he obtains the right to exercise his annuitization option. But the
retirement decision depends on the expected outcome of the annuitization option. There-
fore, in order to ￿nd a solution to (12), we ￿rst have to ￿nd the optimal annuitization
timing and thus, the optimal DC pension income, P (t;t￿
a); for all the possible retirement
times from year 1; 2; 3 to year T: After that, we could attempt to solve for the optimal
4The preference for leisure might also be determined by the intensity of work, desire to travel or
spending time on hobbies, etc..K could be individual speci￿c. For simplicity, I assume K to be either
￿ at or age dependent.
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retirement timing for eq.(12).
The retirement timing decision is an example of optimal stopping problems with ￿xed
horizon. The optimal stopping problem describes the problem of choosing a time to stop
a certain action based on sequentially observed random variables in order to maximize
the expected payo⁄or utility. A random variable ￿ de￿ned on ￿ and taking values in the
time set is called a stopping time if the event f￿ ￿ tg belongs to Ft for all t 2 (1;T): In
other words, for ￿; to be a stopping time, it should be possible to decide whether or not
the event f￿ ￿ tg has occurred based on the knowledge that are known at time t, i.e.,
the knowledge in the information set Ft: The stopping time for retirement decisions is
called retirement stopping time. The retirement problem can be formulated as ￿nding an
optimal retirement stopping time, ￿￿
r; from all retirement stopping times, ￿r; with values

















Mk is the cumulative surviving probability from time 1 to ￿r with M1 = 1:
The annuitization timing decision is also an example of optimal stopping problems
with ￿xed horizon. The stopping time for annuitization decisions is called annuitization
stopping time. The annuitization time, ￿a; must be between retirement time and the
deadline for annuitization, that is, ￿a 2 (￿r; T): The optimal annuitization stopping
timing, ￿￿
a; is the stopping time that maximizes the expected discounted utility of pension
income at retirement time ￿r; with ￿r 2 (1;T); that is,
sup
￿r￿￿a￿T
E￿r [exp(￿￿ (￿a ￿ ￿r))B (￿r;￿a)]; (14)
where B (￿r;￿a) =
Tmax P
s=￿r







1￿￿ and the product, exp(￿￿(￿a￿
￿r))￿B (￿r;￿a), is the sum of the discounted utility of pension income at retirement time
￿r:
The Least Square Monte Carlo (LSM) valuation algorithm developed by Longsta⁄
and Schwartz (2001) is adopted to numerically solve the optimal stopping problem. The
LSM algorithm follows the dynamic programming principle and provides a pathwise ap-
proximation to optimal stopping rules. At time 0; the stock price and interest rate at time
0 are known but future prices and interest rates are unknown. For each of the exercise
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dates, 1;:::T; N paths of stock prices and short-term interest rates are simulated. At
time t and path i; where t could be any time between 1 and T and i could be any of the
simulated paths, the individual would retire or annuitize if the utility of retiring or an-
nuitizing at time t and path i is larger than the expected utility of retiring or annuitizing
later conditional on the information available at time t and path i: The LSM algorithm
guarantees that there will be one and only one optimal stopping time for each path which
solves (13) for the retirement option and (14) for the annuitization option.5 Details of
the numerical solution and the LSM algorithm are provided in Appendix B.
In U.K., the ￿rst pillar state pension is very low, which is about GBP80 per week.
Annuitizing second-pillar employer-sponsored pension wealth can provide a source of
safe retirement income. With respect to private wealth, some individuals may ￿nd it
attractive to annuitize their private wealth to provide more income and some not due to
bequest motives, desires to save for unexpected large expenditures and other reasons. For
simpli￿cation, both bequest motives and private wealth are not considered in this model.
The Retirement Likelihood Measure
The probability estimated at time 0 of retiring before time k, k could be any time between
1 and T; can be computed as follows. Let ￿￿
ri denote the optimal retirement time for path
i; i = 1;2;:::;N. Let H be a N ￿ T matrix, where the rows correspond to the simulated
paths and the columns correspond to time. The matrix H records the optimal retirement
decisions of the individual. If H(i;j) = 1, j is the optimal retirement time for path i;
otherwise, j is not the optimal retirement time for path i; that is,
H(i;j) =
(




By construction, there will be only one "1" in each row.
From the optimal decision matrix, H; we can derive an estimator of the probability
of retiring before and including time k; k > 0: The notation, PR
OptionModel












5ClØment et al. (2002), Eglo⁄(2005) and Moreno and Navas (2003) provide proofs for the convergence
of the LSM algorithm.
49Chapter 3 Annuitization and Retirement Timing Decisions
At time 0, the probability that the individual will retire before and including time k is
the percentage of the paths where the optimal retirement times occur no later than time
k: This probability is referred to as the retirement likelihood measure.
III Retirement Decisions in the UK
In this section, the economic bene￿t of annuitization freedom will be evaluated and the
likelihood measure developed in the previous section will be tested empirically. The
empirical investigation is based on data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing
(ELSA).
Data
ELSA is a biannual panel survey among those aged 50 and over (and their younger
partners) living in private households in England. The ￿eld work for ELSA wave 1 is
conducted in 2002 -3 and for wave 2 in 2004 -5. There are 12,100 individuals interviewed
in wave 1. 1,659 individuals are employed full time (not less than 30 hours per week) and
are interviewed again in wave 2. Among them, 518 persons participate in DC plans and
provides complete information about their DC accounts. The sample consists of these
518 individuals. Detailed information about the sample selection is given in table 1.
In this sample, 29 persons retired by the wave 2 interviews of ELSA. None of the 29
persons report that their main reason of retirement is due to the sickness of themselves
or their family members. 69.5% of the individuals are contracted out which means that
they cannot get retirement income from the second pillar state pensions6. In addition to
the DC schemes, 31.27% of the individuals in the sample also have past DB plans and
11% of the individuals have current DB plans.
Our sample consists of 374 men and 144 women. 18.3% of the individuals have higher
education or equivalent degrees. 30.5% of them didn￿ t receive high school education.
The summary statistics of the DC plan participants￿age, gross income, DC wealth, asset
income, bene￿t income, gross household wealth and debt are presented in table 2. The
average age of the sample members is 55. The average annual gross income is about
$24;400 and the average DC wealth is $33;122: Overall, the size of the average DC plan
is small compared with the gross income. The small size could be caused by the short
contribution records and the contributions to parallel pension plans, for example, DB
plans and state pensions. DC pension plans started widely in the U.K. in the 1990￿ s, which
6A brief introduction to the U.K. pension system is provided in Appendix A.
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Table 1: Sample Selection. This table shows detailed information about the sample
selection, including the reasons why individuals are removed from the sample and the
number of individuals removed. Except reason (5), the other removal reasons are based
on information reported at wave 1 interviews. There are 12,100 individuals participated
in the ELSA wave 1 interviews. The sample in this chapter consists of 518 individuals
with DC pension plans.
Removal Reasons Number of Individuals Removed
(1) Younger than 50 or older than 90 673
(2) Not employed 8375
(3) Work less than 30 hours per week 873
(4) Incomplete information about education 148
(5) Do not participate in wave 2 interviews 372
(6) Do not have DC pension plan 1131
(7) The size of the DC scheme is not known 10
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the DC Plan Participants
Mean Standard Deviation
Current Age 55:24 3:55
Gross Annual Income (in £) 24;443:95 22;955:85
DC Wealth (in £) 33;121:53 49;371:40
Asset Income (in £) 1;635:14 7;926:75
Bene￿t Income (in £) 366:16 1;188:48
Household Wealth 88;611:31 200;977:47
excl. Primary House (in £)
Debt (in £) 3;278:42 7;639:93
means that the individuals in our sample started to contribute to the DC plan in their 40￿ s.
Asset income, bene￿t income, gross household wealth excluding the primary housing and
debt are at household level. Asset income consists of interest income, dividend income
and the rent from second house, etc. Bene￿t income refers to state bene￿ts, for example,
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), Child Bene￿t and Disable Bene￿t. Gross household
wealth is the household￿ s overall wealth excluding the house where they live.
I use quarterly data covering the period January 1984 to December 2002 for the
variables describing the ￿nancial market. For the short rate, I use U.K. Treasury Bill
data from Datastream. I obtain the yield of a 10-year U.K. government zero-coupon bond
from the Bank of England. For the return on stocks I use the total return (including
distributions) on a broad U.K. stock market index constructed by Datastream. The
summary statistics for these variables are provided in table 3. The average return on
stocks is 15.78%. The average yield on the 10-year zero-coupon bond is 8.45%. The
average short rate is only slightly smaller (8.35%) during this particular sample period.
I use the Euler-Maruyama method to discretize the di⁄usion processes of the short
rate, bond price and stock index. The parameters of these di⁄usion processes are esti-
mated from the U.K. data discussed above. The estimation method is introduced brie￿ y in
Appendix C. The estimation results are as follows, ￿r = 0:0232; r = 0:0129; ￿r = 0:0019;
￿s = 0:1639; ￿s = 0:0923 and ￿r = ￿0:0992: The negative interest rate risk premium is
in line with the literature (c.f. Brennan and Xia 2002). The interest rate risk premium is
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Short-Term Interest Rate, 10 - Year Government
Bond Yield and the Stock Market Return in the U.K. 1984 - 2002
Mean Standard Deviation
3-Month UK T-Bill Rate 8:35% 3:00%
10 - Year Zero - Coupon 8:45% 2:37%
UK Government Bond Yield
Annual Return of the U.K. 15:78% 18:10%
Stock Index
negative because investors are averse towards increases in interest rates while concerning
stocks, investors are averse towards decreases in stock prices (De Jong, Schotman and
Werker 2008).
Projected Annual Incomes
Information on past and future gross incomes is necessary to calculate the state pension
and the DB pension income. The past and future gross income is projected based on
the following variables: a gender dummy, experience which is de￿ned as current age less
the age the individual started to work divided by 10, dummies for education degrees and
years of schooling. The (log) current gross annual income is regressed on the above men-
tioned variables and the square term of experience. The sample for testing the retirement
likelihood measure consists of 518 individuals who work full time and have DC plans with
complete information. But this analysis is based on the 1659 individuals who are working
full time as reported at wave 1 interviews in order to make the projection more precise.
The regression results are presented in table 4.
The regression results show that female workers earn signi￿cantly less than male work-
ers. Individuals with high education degree (higher education degree or equivalent) earn
signi￿cantly more than individuals with low (lower than high school degree) and medium
education (high school degree) degrees. Income also increases with years of schooling.
Experience and its square term have correct signs but they are both insigni￿cant which
could due to the fact that the individuals in the sample are of similar age.
In this chapter the in￿ ation rate, ￿; is assumed to be constant at 2% level. The
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Table 4: Projection of Labor Income. The past and future gross incomes are projected
based on the following variables: a gender dummy, experience which is de￿ned as current
age minus the age the individual started to work divided by 10, dummies for education
degrees and years of schooling. High Education is a dummy, which equals to 1 if the
individual has higher education or equivalent degree. Low Education is a dummy, which
equals to 1 if the individual has educational degree lower than high school. The dependent







Low Education ￿0:2094 ￿￿
High Education 0:3424 ￿￿
Years of Schooling 0:0519 ￿￿
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projected past or future labor incomes for individual i, Yprojected; is
Yprojected;i = EY (￿)i exp(￿ (￿ ￿ Fi));
where Fi is the individual i￿ s current age, ￿ stands for individual i￿ s future age, ￿ > Fi; or
past age, ￿ < Fi; and EY (￿)i denote the projected labor income of individual i at wave 1
interviews if he is ￿ years old at that time which is derived from the regression reported
in table 4.
The State Pension7
The amount of state pension the individuals can receive depends on, among others,
whether they are contracted out of the second-pillar state pension system and how long
they have contributed to the state pension. The individual cannot receive their state pen-
sion until his State Pension Age is reached. If the individual delays receiving the state
pension, the amount of pension is increased, at present, by approximately 7.5 per cent
per year of delay in return. The maximum reward for deferment is 37 per cent, which is
achieved by deferring for ￿ve years.
For the individuals who contracted out (in) in the wave 1, I assume that they con-
tracted out (in) throughout their working life. Before 2002, the second pillar state pension
is called SERPS. After 2002, the SERPS is replaced by S2P. But since S2P is only intro-
duced in 2002, the individuals￿contribution records to S2P are very short. Therefore, this
reform does not have big impact on the individuals￿pension income at 2004. Thus, in this
chapter, this reform is ignored. Department of Work and Pensions (2005) gives a very
detailed description about the calculation of the ￿rst pillar state pension income (BSP)
and the second pillar state pension income (SERPS) which is adopted for the calculation
of state pension in this chapter.
The Economic Bene￿ts of Annuitization Freedom
I use the certainty equivalent gain to quantify the economic bene￿t of annuitization. The
certainty equivalent gain is de￿ned as the percentage di⁄erence between the certainty
equivalent wealth at time 0 of retiring in the future with and without annuitization
freedom. For the case without annuitization freedom, the individual has to annuitize at
the retirement date. In the sample, the average discounted certainty equivalent gains
are about 1.8%, 1.2% and 1.0% for individuals who retire at year 1, year 2 and year
7Please see Appendix A for an introduction to the U.K. pension system.
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3, respectively. The distributions of the certainty equivalent gains are shown in ￿gure
1. The certainty equivalent gain distributions are almost identical for the two leisure
parameter speci￿cations. Assuming that all 518 individuals in the sample retire at year
1, certainty equivalent gains between 0% and 2% (the ￿rst column) are experienced by
320 individuals. There are about 100 individuals whose certainty equivalent gains are
between 2% and 4% (the second column). The later the retirement date the smaller the
certainty equivalent gains due to time preference, risk aversion and the shortening of the
annuitization option life.
The Estimated Retirement Probability
It is assumed that the interviews of wave 1 are conducted at the end of 2002 and the
interviews of wave 2 are conducted at the end of 2004. For the individuals who are
reported to be retired at wave 2 interviews, the exact retirement years are not known.
Based on the information available at wave 1 interviews, the probabilities of retiring by
wave 2 interviews, PR
OptionModel
2002 ; are estimated for every individuals in the sample from
eq.(16).
I assume that during 2003 and 2004, at the beginning of each year the individual has
a chance to consider retirement. The stock prices and bond prices for the years 2003 and
2004 are simulated from the di⁄usion processes (3) and (6). The value of the parameters
of these di⁄usion processes are estimated from the market prices before and up to the
end of 2002. 2000 paths for future stock and bond prices are simulated. The subjective
discount factor, ￿; is set to 0:03; the risk aversion parameter, ￿; is 5; and the preference





￿5. 70% of the portfolio assets are stocks and 30% are bonds, that is,
￿ = 0:7: The load factor in the annuity price calculation (8) is assumed to be 0.2. The
mortality rates are obtained from the U.K. Government Actuary￿ s Department (GAD).
The maximum age individuals can live is assumed to be 100.
Table 5 reports actual and average predicted percentages of individuals who retire
during 2003 and 2004 for the whole sample (518 individuals) and two subsamples. Sub-
sample 1 consists of individuals who were retired by wave 2 and subsample 2 consists
of individuals who were not yet retired by wave 2. The actual percentage of retirement
is 5.6%. The predicted percentage of retirement is 7.75% for speci￿cation 1 and 6.14%
for speci￿cation 2. The predicted percentage of retirement for subsample 1 is 20.57% for
speci￿cation 1 and 33.10% for speci￿cation 2. For subsample 2, the predicted percentage
of retirement is 6.99% for speci￿cation 1 and 4.54% for speci￿cation 2.
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Panel a:  The certainty equivalent gains wh en
retiring at year 1



































Panel b:  The certainty equivalent gains when
retiring at year 2




































Panel c:  The certainty equivalent gains when
retiring at year 3
Figure 1: The Certainty Equivalent Gain of Annuitization Freedom. This ￿gure shows
the certainty equivalent gain of annuitization freedom. The certainty equivalent gain is
de￿ned as the percentage di⁄erence between the certainty equivalent wealth at time 0 of
retiring in the future with and without annuitization freedom. For the case without an-
nuitization freedom, the individual has to annuitize at the retirement date. The certainty
equivalent gain scale 1 refers to the interval [0%, 2%], scale 2 refers to [2%, 4%], scale
3 refers to [4%, 6%], scale 4 refers to [6%, 8%], scale 5 refers to [8%, 10%], and scale 6
refers to [10%, +1]. In speci￿cation 1, the leisure parameter is a constant, K = 1:5, and
in speci￿cation 2 the leisure parameter is age dependent, K = (F=55)
5 : Panel a, b and c
show the certainty equivalent gains under the assumption that all 518 individuals retire
at year 1, year 2 and year 3, respectively.
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Table 5: The predicted retirement probability evaluated at the end of 2002 is an indicator
measuring how likely the individuals will retire between 2003 and 2004. It is evaluated
with the method discussed in section 2. This table reports the mean of the estimated
retirement probability for the whole sample, the subsample consisting of individuals re-
tired at wave 2, and the subsample consisting of individuals who are not retired at wave
2. There are two speci￿cations for parameter K. In model speci￿cation 1, the disutility
of work parameter K is a constant which equals to 1.5. In model speci￿cation 2, the
disutility of work parameter is age dependent.




K = 1:5 K = (F=55)
5
Whole Sample 5:60% 7:75% 6:14%
Subsample 1: Retired 100:00% 20:57% 33:10%
Subsample 2: Not Retired 0:00% 6:99% 4:54%
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The Proxy of Retirement Incentive
In order to check whether the retirement likelihood measure, PR
OptionModel
2002 ; is signi￿cant
in explaining and predicting the retirement decision making in reality, the retirement
likelihood measure is treated as a proxy for retirement incentives. A Probit analysis is
applied to test the signi￿cance of this proxy8. The dependent variable is the sample
individuals￿retirement decisions reported at wave 2 interviews which takes value 1 if
the individual is reported to be retired and 0 if not. The variables, Asset Income (AI),
Bene￿t Income (BI), Gross Household Wealth (GH) and Debt, which are not used for
calculating PR
OptionModel
2002 are also included in the analysis. The results are presented in
table 6. For both leisure parameter speci￿cations, the proxy of retirement incentives,
PR
OptionModel
2002 ; is positive and signi￿cant at 1% level no matter whether the other four
variables are included or not. This analysis shows that the retirement likelihood has
signi￿cant explanatory power in explaining and predicting the retirement decision in
reality. It also means that ￿nancial incentives are important to the DC plan participants
when they are making their retirement decision.
The Model Fit
The model ￿t is analyzed by comparing the actual retirement probability at wave 2
interviews, the predicted retirement probability from the option model based on wave
1 interview information, PR
OptionModel
2002 ; and the predicted retirement probability from a
Probit model, PRProbit
2002 ; where the regressors are variables such as, age, gender, education
dummies, gross income and DC wealth, which are used for evaluating the retirement
likelihood measure PR
OptionModel
2002 and the dependent variable is the retirement decision
at wave 2. The probability of retiring by wave 2 interviews computed from this Probit
model is actually an in-sample prediction. By contrast, the prediction from the option
model is out of sample.
The Probit regression reported in table 7 shows the impact of these variables on the
individuals￿retirement decision in the sample. The results are very intuitive. Older indi-
viduals are signi￿cantly more likely to retire than younger ones. Women are signi￿cantly
more likely to retire than men. This is because in the U.K., the State Pension Age for
women at 2002 is lower than that for men. Age and gender are signi￿cant at 5% level.
DC wealth, gross income and education dummies have expected signs, but they are in-
signi￿cant. From the Probit model in table 7, for each individual we can compute the
8The estimation error of the estimated retirement likelihood measure, PR
OptionModel
2002 ; is not taken
into account when estimating the standard deviation of the estimated slope coe¢ cient of this variable.
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Table 6: Retirement Likelihood Measure As a Proxy for Retirement Incentive. This table
reports the results of the Probit regression where the retirement probability derived from
the option model is cheated as a retirement incentive. The dependent variable equals to 1
when the individual is reported to be retired at wave 2 and 0 otherwise. Asset income (AI)
consists of interest income, dividend income and the rent from second house, etc. Bene￿t
income (BI) refers to the state bene￿ts, for example, Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG),
Child Bene￿t and Disable Bene￿t. Gross household wealth (GH) is the household￿ s overall
wealth excluding the house where they live. There are two speci￿cations for parameter
K. In model speci￿cation 1, the disutility of work parameter K is a constant which equals
to 1.5. In model speci￿cation 2, the disutility of work parameter is age dependent. Panels
A and B report the results from speci￿cation 1 and 2, respectively. One star stands for
signi￿cance at 10 percent level and two stars stand for signi￿cance at 5 percent level and
three stars stand for signi￿cance at 1 percent level.
Submodel 1 Submodel 2
Panel A: Speci￿cation 1




2002 0:7288 ￿￿￿ 0:7554 ￿￿￿
(0:2820) (0:2895)
Asset Income (AI) / £1000 ￿0:0075
(0:0177)
Bene￿t Income (BI) / £100 0:0045
(0:0064)




Panel B: Speci￿cation 2









Asset Income (AI) / £1000 ￿0:0115
(0:0210)
Bene￿t Income (BI) / £100 0:0061
(0:0064)
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Table 7: Comparison Probit Regression. This table reports the results of the Probit
regression of age, gender and other variables related to individual retirement decisions.
The dependent variable equals to 1 when the individual is reported to be retired at wave
2 and 0 otherwise. The gender dummy equals to 1 for woman and 0 for man. The
high education dummy equals to 1 for the individuals with higher education degree or
equivalent. The low education dummy equals to 1 for the individuals with degree lower
than high school degree. One star stands for signi￿cance at 10 percent level and two stars
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(in-sample) probability of retiring by wave 2 interviews, PRProbit
2002 :
As in Stock and Wise (1990), I divide the sample into several age groups and then
compare the actual retirement ratio in each age group with the predictions from the op-
tion model, PR
OptionModel
2002 ; and from the Probit model, PRProbit
2002 . The results are shown in
￿gure 2 and table 8. It can be seen from ￿gure 2, that the actual retirement probability
increases with age. The predictions from the option model catches this trend very well
especially the one from speci￿cation 2. The correlations between the option model proba-
bilities and the actual retirement probabilities are 0.89 for model speci￿cation 1 (K = 1:5)




￿5). The correlation between the (in-sample)
Probit model probabilities and the actual probabilities is 0.94. Furthermore, the option
model probabilities have roughly the same roots of Mean Square Errors (MSEs) as those
from the Probit analysis. The root of the MSE is 6% for the Probit model, 7% for the
option model speci￿cation 1 and 5% for the option model speci￿cation 2.
The sample was also divided by the DC wealth level. Level 1 includes the individuals
with DC wealth smaller than $5;000: Level 2 includes individuals with DC wealth larger
than $5;000 but smaller than $10;000 and so on until level 7 which is the highest level
and includes the individuals with DC wealth larger than or equal to $150;000: The
results are reported in ￿gure 3 and table 9. Overall, the actual retirement probability
is increasing with the DC wealth level. The correlation coe¢ cient between the actual
retirement ratio (column 2 in table 9) and the predicted retirement ratio from the Probit
model is 0.78. The correlation coe¢ cient between the actual retirement ratio and the
predicted retirement ratios from the option models are about 0.72 for speci￿cation 1 and
0.67 for speci￿cation 2. The root of the MSE of the Probit model is 2%. The roots of
the MSEs of option model speci￿cations 1 and 2 are 27% and 19%, respectively. The
relatively large MSEs are due to the prediction errors for the very wealthy groups (group
6 and 7). There are 39 individuals in these two groups. The roots of the MSEs of option
model speci￿cations 1 and 2 without these individuals are about 3%:
The prediction errors might be explained by other factors which are not captured
by this model, e.g., partner￿ s retirement decision, riskness of labor income and labour
intensity of the job. It is well documented that couples prefer to retirement together or
very shortly one after the other (c.f., Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000, 2002 and 2004). An
unexpected salary cut can also increase the incentive to retire. Furthermore, individuals
with more labor intensive work might want to retire earlier than others.
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Figure 2: Actual and Predicted Retirement Ratios By Age Groups. This ￿gure shows
the actual and predicted retirement ratios from the Probit model and the option model
which are reported in table 8.
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Table 8: Actual and Predicted Retirement Ratios By Age Groups. This table shows the
actual and predicted retirement ratios from the Probit model presented in table 7 and
the option model described in section 2. The actual percentage of retirement measures
the percentage of individuals retired by the end of 2004 for each age group. In the option
model, there are two speci￿cations for the leisure parameter, K. In speci￿cation 1, the
disutility of work parameter K is a constant which equals to 1.5. In model speci￿cation
2, the disutility of work parameter is age dependent.
Age No. of Obs Actual Percentage In-Sample Probit Out-of-Sample Option
of Retirement Model Prediction Model Prediction
K = 1:5 K = (F=55)5
50 29 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
51 50 0:02 0:01 0:02 0:00
52 53 0:02 0:01 0:04 0:00
53 56 0:02 0:02 0:04 0:02
54 59 0:02 0:02 0:04 0:02
55 58 0:03 0:03 0:06 0:04
56 50 0:00 0:04 0:10 0:01
57 25 0:12 0:06 0:08 0:04
58 36 0:08 0:07 0:12 0:09
59 33 0:03 0:10 0:11 0:10
60 21 0:05 0:12 0:10 0:14
61 18 0:17 0:17 0:23 0:24
62 12 0:25 0:22 0:16 0:19
>= 63 18 0:50 0:33 0:31 0:56
Corr. Coef. With Column 3 0:94 0:89 0:94
Root of Mean Squared Error 0:06 0:07 0:05
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Figure 3: The Actual and Predicted Retirement Ratios By DC Wealth Group. This
￿gure shows the actual and predicted retirement ratios from the Probit model and the
option model. The actual percentage of retirement measures the percentage of individuals
retired by the end of 2004 for each wealth group. The Probit model is described in table 7.
The option model is described in section 2. Group 1 are the individuals with DC wealth
less than £5,000, Group 2 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £5,000 and
£10,000, Group 3 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £10,000 and £25,000,
Group 4 includes the individuals with DC wealth between £25,000 and £50,000, Group 5
includes the individuals with DC wealth between £50,000 and £100,000, Group 6 includes
the individuals with DC wealth between £100,000 and £150,000, and Group 7 includes
the individuals with DC wealth larger or equal to £150,000.
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Table 9: Actual and Predicted Retirement Ratio By DC Wealth Groups. This table shows
the actual and predicted retirement ratios from the Probit model and the option model.
The actual percentage of retirement measures the percentage of individuals retired by the
end of 2004 for each wealth group. Probit model is described in table 7 and the prediction
from the option model is described in section 2.
Level DC Wealth No. of Actual Ret. In-Sample Probit Out-of-Sample Option
(in $1000) Obs Percentage Model Prediction Model Prediction
K = 1:5 K = (F=55)5
1 < 5 132 0:05 0:06 0:02 0:01
2 [5;10] 70 0:04 0:05 0:00 0:01
3 [10;25] 145 0:04 0:05 0:04 0:05
4 [25;50] 56 0:07 0:05 0:03 0:02
5 [50;100] 76 0:08 0:05 0:09 0:05
6 [100;150] 17 0:12 0:10 0:42 0:28
7 >= 150 22 0:09 0:11 0:74 0:55
Corr. Coef with Column 4 0:78 0:72 0:67
Root of Mean Square Error 0:02 0:27 0:19
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Generally speaking, the performance of the option model, especially using the model
speci￿cation where the leisure parameter is age dependent, in terms of correlations with
the actual retirement probabilities and the roots of the Mean Square Errors, are compa-
rable to the performance of the in-sample Probit predictions. However, for the groups
with large pension wealth, the retirement ratios per group given by the model are much
higher than the actual retirement ratios. In this model, the desire for leisure is increasing
with retirement income. That relationship might need to be adjusted after certain wealth
level.
DC As A Main Retirement Income Source
This subsection studies individuals whose main retirement income is from DC. I select
the individuals by comparing (1) the sum of the present value of non-DC income taking
into account the mortality rate if they retire immediately after wave 1 interviews with
(2) the DC wealth reported at wave 1 interviews. Individuals enter this subsample if the
DC wealth is larger than the sum of the present value of non-DC income. There are 108
individuals in this subsample. The leisure parameter in this subsection is age-dependent.
First, the ￿nancial condition in which individuals ￿nd optimal to retire is also in-
vestigated brie￿ y. The lower the interest rate, the higher the annuity income a retired
person will get for any given value of pension wealth. The option model where retirement
and annuitization occur at the same time predicts that for 27.8% of individuals there are
more than 50% of chances that these persons will retire when the short rate is above its
long-run average. The option model with annuitization optimization predicts that for
31.5% of individuals there are more than 50% of chances that they will retire when the
short rate is relatively high.
Second, the result of the Probit model estimation where the retirement rate predicted
by the option model with annuitization optimization is treated as a retirement incentive
proxy is presented in table (10). Table (10) also shows the Probit regressions of other
retirement incentive proxies, namely, (1) the proxy derived from the model where indi-
viduals retire and annuitize at the same time and (2) the proxy derived from the model
using scenarios which are most close to realized scenarios in 2003 and 2004. I use the
K-nearest neighbour (KNN) method to select 10 scenarios. The marginal e⁄ect is used
as an indicator for prediction precision. Table (10) shows that all retirement incentives
are signi￿cant and positive in predicting the actual retirement decision. The predictions
from both models with annuitization optimization generate higher marginal e⁄ect than
the prediction from the model without annuitzation optimization.
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IV Conclusions
This chapter models the real options to retire and - conditional on retirement - to annuitize
the accumulated wealth in De￿ned Contribution (DC) pension schemes. It contributes
to the extensive literature on the option value of retirement in the tradition of Stock
and Wise (1990) but shifts the focus from participants in De￿ned Bene￿t (DB) schemes
to participants in DC schemes. This accounts for the observation that DB schemes are
increasingly being replaced by DC schemes in most industrialized countries including the
U.S. and the U.K.. A major contribution of this chapter is to recognize and model the
sequence of retirement and annuitization options. Since annuitization does not need to
occur at the retirement date in many DC schemes, participants in DC schemes can time
the ￿nancial markets in order to annuitize in an environment of high prices on the stock
market which increase the DC wealth and high interest rates which reduce the price of
an annuity. In a model where individuals obtain utility from leisure, labor income before
retirement and pension income after retirement, I show that the freedom to optimally
choose the annuitization time can lead to an increase of certainty equivalent wealth of up
to 1.8%. Hence, the embedded annuitization option in the retirement option value is of
signi￿cant economic value to individuals.
In order to assess the predictive power of my model, I compare retirement likelihoods
derived from the theoretical setup with retirement decisions observed at the second wave
of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) for a sample of individuals who were
full-time employed at the time of the ￿rst wave interviews. It turns out that the theory-
motivated retirement likelihood measure is a statistically signi￿cant predictor of actual
retirement decisions. Moreover, I show that the proposed retirement likelihood measure
is highly correlated with observed retirement ratios across groups of individuals de￿ned
by age or wealth. The correlation reaches 94% and is not dominated by the predictions
of a retirement Probit model which in contrast to my proposed retirement likelihood
measure is based on in sample information. With a magnitude of 5%, root mean square
errors turn out to be small. These empirical results suggest that individuals do take into
account the embedded annuitization option when they decide on when to retire.
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Table 10: Retirement Likelihood Measure As a Proxy for Retirement Incentive. This
table reports the results of the Probit regression where the retirement probability derived
from three option models, (1) option model with annuitization optimization, (2) option
model without annuitization optimization and (3) option model with scenarios selected by
K Nearest Neighbour method. The dependent variable equals to 1 when the individual is
reported to be retired at wave 2 and 0 otherwise. The leisure parameter is age dependent.
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Appendix A
The British Pension System
The U.K. pension system consists of three main pillars. The ￿rst pillar, known as Basic
State Pension (BSP), is a mandatory, ￿ at rate state pension9. The second pillar system is
provided by the state, employers and private sector ￿nancial institutions. In the second
pillar, the employees have considerable choices over the type of pension that they can
accumulate. The main choices are between: (1) an earnings-related state pension plan10;
(2) an occupational DB plan provided by employers and (3) an occupational DC pension
plan. The state pension plan o⁄ers a pension that is low relative to average earnings, but
is fully indexed to prices after retirement. The occupational DB plan o⁄ers a relatively
high level of pension to the employees who spend most of their working time with the
same employer, but provides poor transfer values between plans on changing jobs. The
occupational DC pension plan is fully portable, but the pension income depends on
uncertain investment returns (see Blake 2003). The second pillar state pension is by
default compulsory to all the employees who earn above a lower threshold set by the
state. But individuals are able to contract out of the second pillar state pension into
an occupational pension scheme provided that the latter is at least as generous as the
second-pillar state pension. The third pillar consists of voluntary private pension plans11.
The third pillar pension arrangements are usually of DC type.
In the U.K., the DC plan participants do not have to annuitize their DC wealth
immediately at the retirement date. Up to one-quarter of the value of a pension fund
can be taken as a lump sum, but three-quarters must be annuitized before the age of 75
(Finance Act 1995)12. The obligation to annuitize DC wealth and the freedom in choosing
the annuitization time are the most important reasons why U.K. data is selected for the
empirical investigation in this chapter.
9The BSP is funded on a pay-as-you-go basis. It is a ￿ at rate bene￿t. Individuals are entitled to at
least some part of the BSP if they have made National Insurance (NI) contributions for at least 25%
of their working lives. The BSP bene￿t in 2006/7 is about £85 per week (Department of Work and
Pensions). This bene￿t is indexed to in￿ ation (Clark and Emmerson 2003).
10The second pillar state pension plan was called State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) and
replaced by State Second Pension (S2P) in 2002. The second pillar state pension plans are of DB nature
(Cocco and Lopes 2004). Both the ￿rst and second pillar state pensions are paid by the Department of
Pension and Working once the retiree reaches his State Pension Age (SPA). Currently the State Pension
Age is 65 for men and 60 for women. By 2020, the SPA for woman will increase gradually to 65.
11Employers and individuals can also make additional contributions to a private pension. The state
supports the savings in private pension plans through tax relief (see Clark and Emmerson 2003).
12Since April 6, 2006, which is after the second wave interviews of ELSA, the individuals at age 75 can
also choose to drawdown their DC wealth without annuitization, known as Alternatively Secured Pension
(ASP). But tax charges introduced by the government on ASP make this option very unattractive to
retirees.
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Appendix B
The Solution Method
The optimal annuitization and retirement decisions are very similar to the decision of
exercising an American option optimally, in the sense that, like the American option, both
the retirement and annuitization decisions can be made at any stopping time between the
"purchase" date, in our cases, the time when the individual is allowed to retire/annuitize,
and the "expiration" date, in our cases, the time when the individual turns 75 years old.
Let n be the "purchase" date of an annuitization option or a retirement option. The
optimal annuitization and retirement stopping problems can be stated as
Vn = sup
n￿￿￿T
En [exp(￿￿ (￿ ￿ n))Z￿]; (17)






U (￿) for the retirement option, Z (￿) = B (￿) for the
annuitization option, n = 1 for the retirement option and n = ￿r for the annuitization
option.
The standard solution to a optimal stopping problem with ￿nite horizon is to follow
the dynamic programming principle (c.f. Peskir and Shiryaev 2006). Let Jt be the highest
attainable expected utility at time t the individual can achieve if he exercises his option
at or later than time t, that is,
Jt = sup
t￿￿￿T
exp(￿￿ (￿ ￿ t))E (Z￿jFt):
Here exercising an option means retiring for the retirement option and annuitizing for
the annuitization option. At time t = T , the individual has to stop immediately and
gains JT = ZT: At time t = T ￿ ￿t; where ￿t stands for very short period of time,
he can either stop or continue. If he stops, ￿ = t and JT￿￿t equals to ZT￿￿t, and if
he continues, ￿ = T and JT￿￿t equals to exp(￿￿￿t)E (JTjFT￿￿t): It follows that if
ZT￿￿t ￿ exp(￿￿￿t)E (JTjFT￿￿t) then he needs to stop at time t = T ￿ ￿t; otherwise,
he needs to continue at time t = T ￿ ￿t: This decision rule re￿ ects the fact that the
individual￿ s decision about stopping or continuation at time t = T ￿ ￿t must be based
on the information contained in FT￿￿t only. For t = T ￿ 2￿t;:::;n; the considerations
are continued analogously.
The method of backward induction just explained leads to a sequence of random
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variables, (Jt)n￿t￿T ; de￿ned recursively as follows:
Jt = ZT for t = T;
Jt = max(Zt; exp(￿￿￿t)E (Jt+￿tjFt)) for t = T ￿ ￿t;:::n:
The method also suggests that we consider the following stopping time
￿n = minfn ￿ k ￿ T : Jk = Zkg (18)
as a candidate for optimal stopping time for problem (17). Peskir and Shiryaev (2006)
proved that ￿n is indeed the optimal stopping time in (17). The proof is provided in
Appendix C.
At time t; t < T; the value of immediate exercise, Zt; is known to the individ-
ual. But the value of exp(￿￿￿t)E (Jt+￿tjFt) is still unknown. The key to solve the
optimal stopping problem (17) is therefore, to evaluate the conditional expectations,
exp(￿￿￿t)E (Jt+￿tjFt) for t = T ￿ ￿t;:::n: Least Square Monte Carlo (LSM) valua-
tion algorithm developed by Longsta⁄ and Schwartz (2001) is adopted to approximate
E (Jt+￿tjFt) and to solve optimal stopping problem numerically. ClØment, Lamberton
and Protter (2002), Eglo⁄ (2005) and Moreno and Navas (2003) proved the convergence
of the LSM algorithm.
The Least Square Monte Carlo (LSM) Algorithm
The objective of the LSM algorithm is to provide a pathwise approximation to the optimal
stopping rules. It is assumed that the option can only be exercised and considered at
a ￿nite number of discrete times, n;:::;t; t + ￿t;:::T. For each exercise date, n;:::T; N
paths (scenarios) of stock prices and short-term interest rates are simulated.
The LSM algorithm follows the standard backward induction method as described
previously. At the ￿nal expiration date, T; the option has to be exercised, the individual
gets ZT;i; where i stands for a simulated path and i = 1;2;:::N: At exercise dates before
the ￿nal expiration date, say time t; the individual must choose whether to exercise the
option immediately or to keep the option alive and make the exercise decision at the
next exercise date. At time t, for any path i; where the utility from immediate exercise,
Zt;i; is larger than or equal to the expected utility of continuation conditional on the
information available at time t and path i, exp(￿￿￿t)E (Jt+￿tjFt;i); it is optimal to
exercise the option. For any paths where the opposite holds, it is optimal to wait.
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At time t and path i; the value of immediate exercise, Zt;i; is known to the indi-
vidual but the value of waiting, E (Jt+￿tjFt;i); is unknown. The conditional expec-
tation at time t and path i; (￿￿￿t)E (Jt+￿tjFt;i); is approximated by regressing the
vector of discounted value of continuation at time t, exp(￿￿￿t)Jt+￿t; where Jt+￿t =
(Jt+￿t;1;Jt+￿t;2;:::Jt+￿t;N)
0, on the simulated paths of relevant state variables at time t,
X0
ts where X0
ts include the utility at time t and the DC wealth at time t.
Let ^ Em (Jt+￿tjXt;i) denote the estimated conditional expectation at time t and path
i. The individual will decide at time t whether to exercise the option or not. For the
paths where the value of immediate exercise, Zt;i; is larger (smaller) than or equal to the
estimated conditional expectation, exp(￿￿￿t) ^ Em (Jt+￿tjXt;i); it is optimal to exercise
the option (wait). Proceed these calculations and comparisons recursively backwards
until the "purchase" date is reached. The optimal stopping time for each path is then
decided by starting from the "purchase" date, moving along each path until the ￿rst
stopping time. For each path, the ￿rst stopping time is the optimal exercise time for that
path. Thus, there will be one and only one optimal stopping time for each path.
Appendix C
We have
Jn ￿ E (Z￿jFn) for each ￿ 2 (n;T); (19)
Jn = E (Z￿njFn): (20)
Taking expectation in (19); we ￿nd that EJn ￿ E (Z￿jFn) for all ￿ 2 (n;T) and hence
by taking the supremum over all ￿ 2 (n;T) we see that EJn ￿ Vn: On the other hand,
taking the expectation in (20), we get EJn = E (Z￿njFn): Since ￿n 2 (n;T) and (17);
it holds that E (Z￿njFn) ￿ Vn and therefore, EJn ￿ Vn . The two inequalities give the
equality Vn = EJn; and since EJn = E (Z￿njFn); we see Vn = E (Z￿njFn) implying that
￿n is the optimal stopping time to the problem (17).
Appendix D: The Parameter Estimation
In this subsection, the parameters of the di⁄usion processes, (2), (3) and (6), will be
estimated. The Euler-Maruyama method is used to derive the discrete-time approxi-
mations of these di⁄usion processes. For the short term interest rate, the discrete-time
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approximation is
rt+￿t ￿ rt = ￿r (r ￿ rt)￿t + ur;t+￿t; (21)
rt+￿t = ￿ + ￿rrt + ur;t+￿t; (22)
where the error term, ur;t+￿t = ￿r￿Z1with ￿Z1 = Z1;t+￿t￿ Z1;t; is normal distributed
with










￿ = ￿rr￿t and ￿r = 1 ￿ ￿r￿t: The discrete-time approximation of the stock index is
St+￿t ￿ St = St (rt + ￿s￿s)￿t + us;t+￿t; (23)
where the error term, us;t+￿t = ￿sSt￿Z2 with ￿Z2 = Z2;t+￿t￿ Z2;t; has the properties












The distribution of the excess return on stock index can be approximated by a normal
distribution with mean ￿s￿s￿t and variance ￿2
s￿t: For this estimation, ￿t is taken to be
1, referring to 1 quarter of a year.
The estimation of the AR(1) model (22) is presented in table 10. The AR(1) term of
the short rate, ￿r; is signi￿cant at 1% level. From the estimation reported in table 3, we
can get ￿r = 0:0232 and r = 0:0129: The volatility of the short rate, ￿r; is derived from
the residuals of the two AR(1) process and ￿r = 0:0019. The price of risk for stock index
and the volatility of stock index are estimated from the distribution of excess return of
stock index. We have ￿s = 0:1639 and ￿s = 0:0923: The correlation coe¢ cient between
the two residuals, ur;t+￿t and us;t+￿t; is ￿0:1106:
Let the yield of a 10-year zero-coupon government bond derived from Vasicek model
be ^ Yt, which is a function of ￿r and let Yt stands for the yield in the data sample. ￿r is







^ Yt (￿r) ￿ Yt
￿2
:
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Table 11: Estimation of AR(1) Processes for Stock Index and Short-Term Interest. One
star means signi￿cance at 10 percent level, two stars mean signi￿cance at 5 percent level







The price of risk for short-term interest rate, ￿r; is ￿0:0992.
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sion Underfunding Risk
This chapter is based on Shi and Werker (2009b).
I Introduction
The recent ￿nancial crisis resulted in an unprecedented deterioration of De￿ned Bene￿t
(DB) pension plans￿funding ratios all over the world. Companies sponsoring these un-
derfunded plans are typically required by law to make additional ￿nancial contributions
to close the funding gap. These days sponsoring companies often have limited ability to
obtain outside ￿nance. Additional contributions to pension plans can worsen the ￿nancial
constraint even further. In this chapter we develop an investment strategy for sponsoring
companies aiming to mitigate the impact of liquidity shocks caused by the pension plan
underfunding. We also estimate gains of following such a strategy.
With a perfect ￿nancial market and no taxes, the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model
predicts that additional pension contributions should not a⁄ect the investment decision of
sponsoring companies. However, Rauh (2006) empirically investigates the impact of DB
pension plan underfunding on sponsoring companies￿investment decisions in the U.S.
He ￿nds strong evidence that sponsoring companies￿capital expenditures decline with
additional pension contributions. Overall, ￿nancial constraints distort the corporate in-
vestment in two ways, either through higher capital cost or credit availability. Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss
(1984), among others, argue that external capital is much more costly than internal cap-
ital due to di⁄erent tax rates, information asymmetry between manager and investor,
incomplete contracting and agency costs. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2009) inves-
tigate the impact of a credit supply shock on ￿nancial policies of ￿nancially constrained
companies. They survey more than 1000 chief ￿nancial o¢ cers (CFO) in December 2008.
They ￿nd direct evidence that a majority of constrained U.S. companies cancel their
promising investment projects due to ￿nancial constraints.
DB pension plans gained their popularity during and after World War II. In an attempt
to control in￿ ation at that time, the wages are binding. Therefore, employers o⁄ered
generous deferred employee payments for example pension bene￿ts to attract scare labor
force (FDIC 2006). Unfavorable ￿nancial market performances in recent years increased
the cost of DB pension plans and accelerated the trend to shift from DB to DC. However,
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many companies continue to o⁄er DB pension bene￿t because they know o⁄ering DB
pension bene￿t gives them better chances in hiring and retaining the best employees
(FDIC 2006). DB pension bene￿t is often de￿ned as a certainty percentage of salaries.
Salaries of a worker close to retirement is typically higher than the ones in the mid of his
career. Thus, if he leaves the employer early, he will get less pension. At this moment,
there are still 34 million working and retired Americans depend on DB pension plans
(FDIC 2006). The healthiness of the sponsoring companies is vital to support these DB
pension plans.
In this chapter, we ￿nd an optimal dynamic investment strategy which minimizes the
impact of DB pension plan underfunding on the value of the sponsoring company. In our
model, the company has a limited amount of internal capital, an opportunity to invest
in a project within a certain period and a limited credit supply. The company sponsors
a DB pension plan and has an obligation to make additional ￿nancial contributions.
We show that the company￿ s optimal investment strategy depends on the amount of
capital available for investment and the initial pension funding ratio unless the company
is extremely ￿nancially constrained or unconstrained. The amount of capital available
for investment is the sum the internal capital and the amount of capital borrowed less
pension contributions. The results indicate that ￿rms with lower pension funding ratio
should have a lower investment threshold value than otherwise identical ￿rms with higher
pension funding ratios. The investment threshold value is the lowest project value above
which the ￿rm will invest. The result is driven by the fact that lower pension funding
ratios mean higher expected future pension contributions and therefore lower values of
waiting: the risk that in the future the capital available for investment will be used to ￿ll
the pension funding gap decreases the value of waiting.
We compare values of two otherwise identical ￿rms following two di⁄erent strategies.
One ￿rm follows the proposed investment strategy taking into account the pension un-
derfunding risk while the other ￿rm follows an investment strategy ignoring the pension
underfunding risk. We ￿nd that following the optimal investment strategy can increase
the investment option value signi￿cantly.
Optimal corporate investment strategies have been investigated extensively in the real
option literature. McDonald and Siegel (1986) study the corporate investment timing
decision for an investment which is irreversible but can be delayed. Standard real option
approaches to corporate investment strategies are explained in detail in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994). Boyle and Guthrie (2003) examine the dynamic investment decision of a ￿rm
subject to a ￿nancial constraint with an in￿nite investment horizon. They show that a
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liquidity-constraint company can have a much lower investment threshold value than an
otherwise identical company without a liquidity constraint due to a lower value of waiting.
As the amount of capital available for investment increases, the investment threshold shifts
up and eventually converges to the unconstrained one. This chapter extends the Boyle and
Guthrie (2003) paper by taking into account the interaction between the ￿rm￿ s investment
strategy, the ￿rm￿ s liquidity constraint and underfunding risk of the sponsored pension
plan. These two papers also di⁄er in the length of investment option life. In Boyle
and Guthrie (2003), the investment option has an in￿nite life, while in our model the
investment option has a ￿nite life, since competition and innovation in a fast developing
knowledge economy as today￿ s very often limit the life of an investment option.
Webb (2007) studies the interaction between a DB pension plan sponsoring company￿ s
capital structure, dividend policy, investment strategy and pension contribution decision
with and without the presence of Pension Bene￿t Guarantee Corporation (PBGC). This
chapter extends Webb (2007) by considering a ￿nancial constraint and a dynamic invest-
ment timing decision.
Borrowing constraints and lower investment returns can cause pension plan underfund-
ing (Cooper and Ross 2002). Underfunding can also be caused by employers￿intensions
to strengthen their bargaining power against labour unions (Ippolito 1985a, b), and to
share risk with employees (Arnott and Gersovitz 1980). No matter what is the cause of
underfunding, nowadays, ￿rms all over the world are required to make additional contri-
bution to their underfunded pension plans to ￿ll the gap. In this chapter, we focus on the
impact of additional pension contributions on the liquidity condition and the investment
decision of the sponsoring ￿rm, while ignoring the source of underfunding.
The outline of this chapter is as follows, Section 2 gives an overview of the model
including the asset and liability structure of the ￿rm and its investment environment.
Section 3 describes the optimal investment strategy under pension underfunding risk
and the increase in the investment project value by following such a strategy. Section 4
concludes.
II The Investment Environment
At time 0, a fully equity ￿nanced ￿rm has, among others, an investment option, a limited
amount of internal capital, a DB pension plan and some illiquid assets. The ￿rm can
exercise the investment option at any time between time 0 and time T. If the option is
exercised at time t; t 2 [0;T]; the ￿rm pays a ￿xed amount I and receives a project Vt:
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In a risk-neutral world, the project value follows a di⁄usion process
dVt = (r ￿ ￿v)Vtdt + ￿vVtdWv;t; (1)
where r is a risk-free investment rate, ￿v is the "convenience yield" of the project1, ￿v
is the volatility of the project value and dWv;t is a standard Brownian motion under the
risk neutral probability.
The amount of internal capital follows the di⁄usion process
dXt = rXtdt + ￿xXtdWx;t; (2)
where ￿x is the volatility of the internal capital and dWx;t is a standard Brownian motion.
The value of the ￿rm￿ s pension liability is assumed to be constant over time at value
L: The di⁄usion process of the funding ratio2 is
dFt = (r ￿ ￿f)Ftdt + ￿fFtdWf;t; (3)
where ￿f is the cost of the pension fund and dWf;t is a standard Brownian motion. The
correlations between the three Brownian motions are ￿v;x; ￿v;f and ￿x;f respectively.
If at time T the funding ratio is smaller than 1; the ￿rm has to make additional
contributions to make the pension plan fully funded again. The sponsoring company is
not allowed to withdraw surplus from the pension plan3. Let AT be the ￿rm￿ s pension
contribution and
AT ￿ (1 ￿ FT)L1FT<1;
where 1FT<1 is an indicator function. Because the funding ratio is log normally distrib-
uted, the expected pension contribution, EtAT; is
EtAT = ￿(d1)L￿(d2) ￿ FtLexp((r ￿ ￿f)(T ￿ t)); 8t < T;
1The "convenience yield" can be the marginal bene￿t generated by the project, for example, an
increased ability to smooth production. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a more detailed description of
the marginal bene￿t.
2The pension funds are subject to various types of regulation, for example, value-at-risk. The impacts
of these regulations on the pension funds￿funding ratios are out of the scope of this chapter.
3We are focusing on extremely underfunded pension plans. For these pension plans, it is very unlikely
that they will be overfunded in a very short horizon, for example one year, and, therefore, the surplus
withdrawal will not play a role here.
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The pension contribution is the ￿rm￿ s debt. The time horizon that this chapter considers
is very short (at the most one year). Usually the ￿rms will not be required to contribute
to the pension plan within a year. Therefore, we only consider underfunding at time T.
The ￿rm can raise new funds to ￿nance the investment project at any time. But the
capacity to raise new funds is limited due to various reasons, for example, moral hazard
and agency issues. As in Boyle and Guthrie (2003), we assume that the amount the ￿rm
can borrow is a certain percentage of the project value at the time of borrowing. Let c
be the borrowing limit with 0 ￿ c < 1. c measures the capital market friction and is
assumed to be exogenous. The amount of cash available for investment, Bt; consists of
the operating asset, Xt, and the amount borrowed, cVt, before time T. At time T, cash




Xt + cVt for t < T
XT + cVT ￿ AT for t = T
: (4)
At time t, the ￿rm can invest in the project if and only if Bt ￿ I: That means the project
value should be at least as large as (I ￿ Xt)=c before time T and (I ￿ XT + AT)=c at
time T, otherwise, the ￿rm will not have enough capital to ￿nance the investment. The
second equation in (4) indicates that the ￿rm should ￿rst pay pension contribution if he
decides to invest in the project at time T.
Table 1 presents the balance sheet of the ￿rm before and immediately after the in-
vestment takes place. Assume that the investment takes place at time i. The equity
value before the investment takes place (Mt) is the sum of option value (Qt), other assets
(OAt) and cash (Xt) less the expected pension contribution (EtAT), t < i. We assume
immediately after investment takes place, the ￿rm will cash in the gain and repay the
debt. The equity value after the investment takes place is sum the cash (Vi￿I +Xi) and
other asset value (OAt) less the expected pension contribution (EtAT), T >= t >= i.
Table 2 summarizes the timeline of the investment decision and pension contribution
requirement. The investment option will expire after time T. Before time T, the ￿rm has
80Chapter 4 Corporate Investment Strategy and Pension Underfunding Risk
Table 1: This table shows the liquidity constrained ￿rm￿ s balance sheet.
Before Investment Takes Place (t < i)
Option Value Qt Value of Debts 0
Cash Xt Expected Pension EtAT
Illiquid Assets OAt contribution
Value of Equity Mt
Total Qt + Xt + OAt Mt + EtAT
Immediately After Investment Takes Place (T ￿ t ￿ i)
Cash Vt + Xt ￿ I Value of Debts 0
Illiquid Assets OAt Expected Pension EtAT
contribution
Value of Equity Mi
Total Vi ￿ I + Xi + OAt Mt + EtAT
a number of chances to decide whether to invest immediately or to wait. When the ￿rm
decides to invest, he will borrow from the ￿nancial market if he is liquidity constrained.
At time T, the ￿rm has to make contributions to the pension plan if the pension plan
is underfunded. If the ￿rm decides to invest in the project, he has to make the pension
contribution before he invests.
The ￿rm is assumed to be fully equity ￿nanced and controlled by the shareholders. In
line with their goal to maximize the ￿rm value, the shareholders want to ￿nd the optimal
investment time which maximizes the value of the investment option at time 0, Q0. That
is, the ￿rm is expected to invest at time ￿￿ such that the expected value at time 0 is
maximized4:
Q0 (￿
￿) = E0 (V￿￿ ￿ I)exp(￿r￿
￿); (5)
where Q0 (￿￿) ￿ Q0 (￿), for all ￿ 2 (0;T), and the borrowing constraint is ful￿lled, i.e.,
B￿￿ ￿ I; where B￿￿ is the amount of capital available for investment which is explained
in (4). The option value at time 0, Q0 (￿￿), is the discounted investment gain, V￿￿ ￿ I:
We will present the option value and the numerical solution for the optimal investment
4It is required by law that a ￿rm should contribute capital to its underfunded pension plan. There is
no regulation about the timing of the investment.
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Table 2: This table shows the timeline of the investment decision and pension contribution
requirement.
Before Time T At Time T
The ￿rm has a number of chances If the pension fund is underfunded,
to decide whether to exercise the ￿rm must pay additional
the investment option immediately contributions to ￿ll the gap.
or to wait.
The ￿rm only borrow at the Exercising the investment option,
time when he decides to invest. if there is enough cash
and the project is pro￿table.
The investment decision will depend If the investment hasn￿ t
on the amount of capital available. been occured by then,
the option expires.
timing problem in next sections.
III The Optimal Investment Strategy and the Op-
tion Value
The Numerical Solution
The corporate investment strategy under pension underfunding risk resembles the optimal
strategy of exercising an American option with ￿nite horizon. We adopt the algorithm de-
veloped by IbÆæez and Zapatero (2004) to solve this problem numerically. The algorithm
is originally designed to estimate the value of an American option using the dynamic
programming principle.
At time T, without a liquidity constraint, if the ￿rm decides to invest, the option
value is
max(VT ￿ I;0):
Without the liquidity constraint, the exercise frontier at time T is the investment cost I:
As soon as the project value is larger than the threshold value; the ￿rm will invest. The
liquidity constraint, XT+ cVT ￿AT ￿ I, indicates that the ￿rm will have enough cash to
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undertake the project if and only if the project value is not smaller than
I￿XT+AT
c . To




T (XT;AT) = max
￿





At time T ￿￿t; the value of immediate exercise is the investment gain max(VT￿￿t ￿
I;0) and the value of waiting is the discounted expected value of exercising the option
optimally at time T, ￿T￿￿t, where
￿T￿￿t = ET￿￿t (VT ￿ I)1VT￿V ￿
T (XT;AT):
Without the liquidity constraint, the ￿rm will exercise the investment option as soon as
the value of immediate exercise is larger than the value of waiting
VT￿￿t ￿ ￿T￿￿t + I: (6)
The presence of a liquidity constraint means that the amount of cash available for invest-





For any given values of XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t, the early exercise frontier is the maximum of
￿T￿￿t + I and
I￿XT￿￿t
c .
For any given values of XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t; the value of immediate exercise, VT￿￿t￿I;
is an increasing and linear function of the project value, VT￿￿t, while the value of waiting,
￿T￿￿t; is an increasing and convex function of the project value, VT￿￿t, which is a com-
mon property of American options. This property guarantees that for any given values
of XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t there will be a value V ￿
T￿￿t such that it is optimal to exercise the
option at time T ￿ ￿t as soon as the project value exceeds the threshold value, V ￿
T￿￿t:
The details of the procedure to derive the investment threshold value are provided in the
appendix. The main idea proceeds as follows. At time T ￿ ￿t, we ￿rst take a grid of
points, (XT￿￿t;FT￿￿t), where XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t are two vectors consisting of simulated
liquid asset values and funding ratios. Then we compute the corresponding investment
threshold values, V￿
T￿￿t, where V￿
T￿￿t is a vector consisting of investment threshold val-
ues corresponding to the vectors XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t. Afterwards, we regress the threshold
values, V￿
T￿￿t, on polynomials of XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t to allow for a parameterization of the
early exercise frontier. Proceeding backwards, we use the same method to parameterize
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the exercise frontiers at exercise times before T ￿ ￿t:
After parameterizing the exercise frontiers at each possible exercise time, we simulate
other N paths for cash stocks, X; project values, V , and funding ratios, F, from time 1 to
time T. For each path, the optimal time to invest is the ￿rst time the value of the project
is not smaller than the early exercise frontier. Let ￿￿
i denote the optimal investment time
for path i; i = 1;2;:::;N. Let H be a N ￿ T matrix, where the rows correspond to the
simulated paths and the columns correspond to time. The matrix H records the optimal
investment decisions of the ￿rm. If H(i;j) = 1, j is the optimal investment time for path
i; otherwise, j is not the optimal investment time for path i
Hi;j =
(




By construction, there will be at the most only one "1" in each row. Let M be the matrix
recording the optimal payo⁄at each path and each time. The value of Mi;j, is a function
of the decision rule, Hi;j and the gain from investment, Vi;j ￿ I;
Mi;j = [Hi;j ￿ (Vi;j ￿ I)]: (9)









which is the average discounted value of the optimal payo⁄s over N simulated paths.
The Optimal Investment Strategy
In this section, we will show investment strategies for ￿rms with various pension funding
ratios. We assume that the investment option will expire in one year and within this
year the ￿rm has four times to exercise the investment option. Table 3 gives the baseline
parameter values used for the numerical solution procedure.
Optimal Investment Strategy Without Pension Plans
Figure 1 shows the early exercise frontiers for liquidity constrained ￿rms without pension
plans. For a liquidity constrained ￿rm, the early exercise frontier depends on the time
to maturity and the value of liquid assets. At any time before maturity, the relationship
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Table 3: Baseline Parameter Values Used in the Numerical Solution Procedure
Parameter Values
Project Investment Cost (I) 20
Interest Rate (r) 0:05
Initial Value of the Project (V0) 20
Volatility of the Project Value (￿v) 0:20
Volatility of Liquid Asset Value (￿x) 0:20
Volatility of Funding Ratio (￿f) 0:20
Value of Pension Liability (L) 25
Time to Maturity (T) 1
Market Friction (c) 0:25
Correlation between Liquid Asset and Project Value (￿xv) 0
Correlation between Funding Ratio and Project Value (￿fv) 0
Convenience Yield of Investment (￿v) 0:03
Pension Surplus Sharing Rule (￿) 0
Pension Fund Management Cost (￿f) 0:03
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between the exercise frontier and the value of liquid assets has a "V" shape. When the
value of liquid assets is low, the early exercise frontier is linearly decreasing with the value
of liquid assets. At low levels of liquid asset value, the investment strategy is dominated
by the borrowing constraint. As the value of liquid assets increases, both the value of
immediate exercise and the value of waiting increase but the latter increases faster than
the former. Therefore, the early exercise frontier shifts upwards. As the value of liquid
assets increases further, the ￿rm becomes liquidity unconstrained and the early exercise
frontier converges to the unconstrained one.
Optimal Investment Strategy With Pension Plans
Figure 2 shows early exercise frontiers for di⁄erent pension funding ratios at three months
to maturity. Firms facing di⁄erent pension funding ratios should follow di⁄erent invest-
ment timing strategies, even though these are ￿rms who are otherwise completely identi-
cal, unless they are extremely ￿nancially constrained or unconstrained. At three month to
maturity, when the value of liquid assets is less than 75% of investment cost, i.e. X0 ￿ 15;
the early exercise frontier is determined by the borrowing constraint. At this level of liq-
uid assets value, the investment strategies of companies with di⁄erent pension funding
ratios are the same. As the value of liquid assets increases, the early exercise frontier
shifts up for all pension funding ratios. But the shift is less pronounced for companies
with lower funding ratios. This is due to the fact that a larger expected pension de￿cit
makes it much more risky to wait. Thus, when the value of liquid assets is between 75%
and 150% of investment cost, i.e., 15 < X0 ￿ 30; the investment threshold increases with
the pension funding ratio. As the value of liquid assets increases further, all ￿rms become
unconstrained and therefore have the same investment strategies again. The early exer-
cise frontiers at earlier times have similar shapes as the ones at three months to maturity;
except that they are converging to a higher level because the value of waiting is getting
smaller as it gets closer to expiration.
The Investment Option Value
The value of investment project at time 0 for ￿rms without pension plans is presented
in table 4. For a unconstrained ￿rm, the investment option value, Q0; is 1.75, which is
independent of the amount of the internal capital. While for an otherwise identically
liquidity constrained ￿rm, the investment option value depends heavily on the amount
of internal capital. When the asset value is 10, which is about 50% of investment cost
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Figure 1: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontiers of the investment option at three
months, six months, nine months and one year to maturity respectively in the absence
of a pension plan. The early exercise frontiers determined by max(I + ￿t; (I ￿ Xt)=c);
t 2 [0;T]; where ￿t is the value of waiting at time t, I is the investment cost, Xt is
the amount of internal capital and c is borrowing constraint which means the maximum
amount the ￿rm can borrow is cVt. The red lines are the frontiers for an unconstrained ￿rm
and the blue dashed lines are the frontiers for an otherwise identical liquidity constrained
￿rm. The parameter values used for simulation are presented in table 1.
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Figure 2: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontiers of the investment option for a
liquidity constrained ￿rm sponsoring a pension plan at three months to maturity. The
pension fund funding ratios are 0.6, 0.85, 1.0 and 1.25 respectively.
(I), the option value is 0.23, which means that the liquidity constraint reduces the option
value by 87%. When the amount of internal capital is 15, which is 75% of the investment
cost, I; the option value is 1.4 and the reduction in option value is 21%. The option value
of a liquidity constrained ￿rm converges to the one of a unconstrained ￿rm as the amount
of internal capital increases. Table 4 also shows how likely that the investment option
will be exercised. Without the liquidity constraint, there is 50% of probability that the
￿rm will invest within one year. The investment probability is reduced dramatically by
the liquidity constraint. When the amount of internal capital is 10, there is only 4.4% of
probability that the ￿rm will invest. When the amount of internal capital is 15, there is
39% of probability that the ￿rm will invest.
The loss an underfunded pension plan brings to the sponsoring ￿rm not only consists
of the amount of mandatory contributions but also of the reduced ability to invest in its
core business due to the liquidity constraint caused by the pension underfunding. Figure 2
proposes an investment timing strategy for the ￿rm with underfunded pension plan which
aims to maximize the option value given pension underfunding. Table 5 and 6 presents
investment option values of two identical ￿rms following di⁄erent investment strategies
with the initial pension funding ratio equals to 0.6, and 0.85 respectively. Both ￿rms are
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Table 4: This table shows the investment option values and investment probabilities for
￿rms without pension plans. The parameter values are presented in table 1. X0 stands
for the amount of internal capital.
Option Value Option Exercise Percentage
X0 Unconstrained Constrained % Reduction Unconstrained Constrained
10 1:7516 0:2305 ￿86:84% 50:00% 4:38%
11 1:7516 0:4212 ￿75:95% 50:00% 9:18%
12 1:7516 0:6850 ￿60:89% 50:00% 16:30%
13 1:7516 0:9560 ￿45:42% 50:00% 24:90%
14 1:7516 1:2058 ￿31:16% 50:00% 33:11%
15 1:7516 1:3888 ￿20:71% 50:00% 39:04%
16 1:7516 1:5296 ￿12:67% 50:00% 43:54%
17 1:7516 1:6184 ￿7:60% 50:00% 46:02%
18 1:7516 1:6696 ￿4:68% 50:00% 47:75%
19 1:7516 1:7135 ￿2:18% 50:00% 48:61%
20 1:7516 1:7289 ￿1:30% 50:00% 49:16%
21 1:7516 1:6810 ￿4:03% 50:00% 49:44%
22 1:7516 1:6967 ￿3:13% 50:00% 49:76%
23 1:7516 1:7240 ￿1:58% 50:00% 49:85%
24 1:7516 1:7329 ￿1:07% 50:00% 49:86%
25 1:7516 1:7356 ￿0:91% 50:00% 49:95%
26 1:7516 1:7476 ￿0:23% 50:00% 49:98%
27 1:7516 1:7216 ￿1:71% 50:00% 49:98%
28 1:7516 1:7434 ￿0:47% 50:00% 50:00%
29 1:7516 1:7406 ￿0:63% 50:00% 50:00%
30 1:7516 1:7248 ￿1:53% 50:00% 50:00%
31 1:7516 1:7217 ￿1:71% 50:00% 50:00%
32 1:7516 1:7400 ￿0:66% 50:00% 50:00%
33 1:7516 1:7334 ￿1:04% 50:00% 50:00%
34 1:7516 1:7338 ￿1:02% 50:00% 50:00%
35 1:7516 1:7290 ￿1:29% 50:00% 50:00%
36 1:7516 1:7416 ￿0:57% 50:00% 50:00%
37 1:7516 1:7256 ￿1:48% 50:00% 50:00%
38 1:7516 1:7128 ￿2:22% 50:00% 50:00%
39 1:7516 1:7297 ￿1:25% 50:00% 50:00%
40 1:7516 1:7275 ￿1:38% 50:00% 50:00%
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sponsoring pension plans facing the same pension plan funding ratios. Firm 2 follows the
optimal investment strategy taking into account the pension underfunding risk and ￿rm
1 follows the strategy which is optimal for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm without a pension
plan.
For a ￿nancially constrained ￿rm with underfunded pension plans, the pension con-
tribution can lead to a large drop of the investment option value. For a ￿rm sponsoring a
60% funded pension plan, even if they follow the optimal strategy taking into account the
pension plan underfunding risk (￿rm 2 in table 5), the pension contribution can reduce
the option value from 0.23 (1.38) to 0.10 (1.1) when the amount of internal capital is 10
(15). For an otherwise identical ￿rm sponsoring a 85% funded pension plan, the pension
contribution can reduce the option value from 0.23 (1.38) to 0.12 (1.26) when the amount
of internal capital is 10 (15).
Results presented in table 5 and table 6 also show that the investment strategy matters
a lot for a ￿rm who is neither extremely constrained nor unconstrained. The bene￿t
of following the strategy taking into account the pension fund underfunding risk ("%
Increase" in table 5 and 6) is ￿rst increasing with the amount of internal capital and
then decreasing. The same conclusions hold for both 60% and 85% funded pension plans.
When the initial value of liquid assets is low, the investment frontier is determined by
the borrowing constraint and therefore the ￿rm values do not di⁄er a lot. As the value
of liquid assets increases to 20, the di⁄erences in option value increase to about 78% for
￿rms with 60% funded pension plan and 28% for ￿rms with 85% funded pension plans5.
For a unconstrained ￿rm, the investment strategy will not be a⁄ected by the pension
fund underfunding. Therefore, the bene￿t is negligible. Since the ￿rm repays their debt
immediately after the investment takes place, higher option value means higher equity
value. The investment strategy proposed by this chapter leads to a higher option value
and thus, also a higher equity value.
Table 5 and 6 also presented the probabilities that the investment will take place. For
a ￿rm with the amount of internal capital smaller than 15, the lower the pension funding
ratio, the less likely that the investment will take place, no matter which strategy the
￿rm follow. However, a ￿rm facing 60% funded pension plan and owning an amount of
internal capital between 15 and 27 is more likely to exercise the investment option than
the unconstrained ￿rm if the ￿rm follows the investment strategy taking into account the
pension plan underfunding risk. As can be seen from ￿gure 2, a ￿rm with underfunded
5The increase in option value is due to the di⁄erence in investment strategy. Firm 1 and ￿rm 2 are
identical ￿rms. The only di⁄erence between these two ￿rms is the investment strategy.
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pension plan should have a lower exercise frontier than the ￿nancially unconstrained one
unless the ￿rm is extremely ￿nancially constrained or rich in cash. The only di⁄erence
between strategies followed by ￿rm1 and ￿rm 2 lie in the option exercise timing. The
gains of following the strategy taking into account the pension plan underfunding risk
shows that timing the investment promptly is important.
Robustness Check
In this section, we will investigate the investment strategies and the gains of following the
investment strategy taking into account the pension plan underfunding risk with di⁄erent
parameter values. The results for funding ratio of 0.6 are presented. The results for other
pension funding ratios which are smaller than 1 are very similar.
Figure 3 shows the investment strategy with di⁄erent volatilities of the amount of
cash owned by the ￿rm, ￿x. The early exercise frontier is decreasing with ￿x, unless
the ￿rm is extremely ￿nancially constrained or unconstrained. Higher ￿x means higher
probability that the ￿rm will have less cash for investment in the future. Therefore, the
￿rm with higher ￿x will invest earlier than otherwise identical ￿rm with lower ￿x. Table
7 shows gains of following the strategy taking into account the pension plan underfunding
risk with di⁄erent ￿x. As in the previous section, the gain is measured by the percentage
increase in the investment option in response to follow the strategy taking into account
the pension plan underfunding risk. This strategy can bring a large increase in project
value for all the values of ￿x unless the ￿rm is extremely constrained or unconstrained.
For example, for a ￿rm with cash equals to the investment cost, I = 20; the gains of
following the strategy proposed by this section are 147%, 72% and 25% for a ￿x equals
to 10%, 20% and 30% respectively.
Figure 4 shows the investment strategies with di⁄erent pension fund funding ratio
volatilities, ￿f. The larger the funding ratio volatility, the more likely that there will be
larger pension contribution in the future6. Therefore, ￿rms with larger pension funding
ratio volatility will have a lower investment threshold value than otherwise identical ￿rms
with a lower funding ratio volatility. The gains of following the strategy proposed is
shown in table 8. The higher the pension funding ratio volatility, the larger the gain. For
6At time T, if the funding ratio is below 1, the ￿rm has to contribute to make it fully funded again.
If funding ratio is above 1, the ￿rm will not share the surplus. It is also very unlikely a 60% funded
pension plan will be well funded in one year with realistic funding ratio volatility value.
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Table 5: This table shows the investment option values and investment probabilities for
￿rms sponsoring a pension fund which is 60 percent funded. Firm 2 follows the optimal
investment strategy taking into account the pension underfunding risk and ￿rm 1 follows
the strategy which is optimal for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm without a pension plan. The
parameter values are presented in table 1. X0 stands for the amount of internal capital.
Cash Option Value Exercise Probabilities
X0 Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase Firm 1 Firm 2
10 0:0986 0:1011 2:58% 1:76% 2:22%
11 0:2493 0:2640 5:90% 4:84% 6:62%
12 0:4589 0:5030 9:61% 9:76% 14:98%
13 0:6498 0:7271 11:90% 14:70% 25:02%
14 0:7903 0:9466 19:78% 18:51% 36:44%
15 0:8740 1:1010 25:98% 20:38% 46:62%
16 0:8139 1:2180 49:65% 18:91% 54:18%
17 0:7816 1:2331 57:76% 17:84% 59:00%
18 0:7170 1:2755 77:89% 16:74% 62:16%
19 0:7616 1:3079 71:74% 17:66% 63:68%
20 0:7481 1:3042 74:32% 18:20% 63:70%
21 0:8161 1:3375 63:89% 20:25% 62:15%
22 0:9154 1:3738 50:08% 23:04% 60:44%
23 0:9646 1:4465 49:97% 25:44% 58:76%
24 1:0858 1:4597 34:44% 28:98% 56:28%
25 1:1771 1:5474 31:47% 31:76% 54:46%
26 1:2978 1:5504 19:46% 35:48% 52:75%
27 1:3112 1:5952 21:66% 37:32% 51:90%
28 1:4499 1:6583 14:37% 40:10% 50:82%
29 1:4811 1:6147 9:02% 41:76% 50:14%
30 1:5293 1:6600 8:55% 43:47% 49:77%
31 1:5628 1:6559 5:96% 44:90% 49:49%
32 1:6257 1:6894 3:92% 45:94% 49:32%
33 1:6540 1:7078 3:25% 46:98% 49:54%
34 1:6788 1:6917 0:77% 47:70% 49:38%
35 1:6822 1:7113 1:73% 48:19% 49:46%
36 1:6710 1:7167 2:73% 48:68% 49:44%
37 1:7187 1:7223 0:21% 48:92% 49:60%
38 1:7045 1:7188 0:84% 49:28% 49:68%
39 1:7337 1:7028 ￿1:78% 49:44% 49:78%
40 1:7154 1:7245 0:53% 49:64% 49:91%
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Table 6: This table shows the investment option values and investment probabilities for
￿rms sponsoring a pension fund which is 85 percent funded. Firm 2 follows the optimal
investment strategy taking into account the pension underfunding risk and ￿rm 1 follows
the strategy which is optimal for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm without a pension plan. The
parameter values are presented in table 1. X0 stands for the amount of internal capital.
Option Value Exercise Probability
Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase Firm 1 Firm 2
10 0:1171 0:1217 3:88% 2:26% 2:46%
11 0:2887 0:3003 4:03% 5:87% 6:73%
12 0:5063 0:5326 5:21% 10:92% 13:78%
13 0:7188 0:8059 12:12% 17:11% 22:76%
14 0:9576 1:0563 10:31% 23:60% 31:36%
15 1:0544 1:2642 19:90% 26:50% 38:28%
16 1:1661 1:3813 18:46% 28:93% 42:72%
17 1:1358 1:4577 28:34% 29:86% 45:80%
18 1:1965 1:5089 26:12% 30:92% 47:09%
19 1:2375 1:5295 23:59% 32:86% 48:70%
20 1:3022 1:5868 21:86% 34:89% 48:60%
21 1:3698 1:6004 16:84% 36:70% 49:06%
22 1:4108 1:6330 15:75% 38:70% 49:31%
23 1:4628 1:6481 12:67% 40:99% 49:20%
24 1:5214 1:6669 9:56% 42:62% 49:52%
25 1:5745 1:6697 6:05% 43:94% 49:37%
26 1:6311 1:6878 3:48% 45:50% 49:36%
27 1:6318 1:6827 3:12% 46:44% 49:46%
28 1:6789 1:7119 1:97% 47:13% 49:58%
29 1:6695 1:7011 1:89% 47:92% 49:56%
30 1:6983 1:7099 0:68% 48:47% 49:62%
31 1:7154 1:6970 ￿1:07% 48:92% 49:66%
32 1:7059 1:6799 ￿1:52% 49:24% 49:68%
33 1:7353 1:7266 ￿0:50% 49:50% 49:84%
34 1:7177 1:7414 1:38% 49:51% 49:84%
35 1:7165 1:7135 ￿0:18% 49:76% 49:88%
36 1:7176 1:7457 1:64% 49:78% 49:94%
37 1:7448 1:7410 ￿0:22% 49:84% 49:96%
38 1:7209 1:7387 1:04% 49:89% 49:98%
39 1:7235 1:7160 ￿0:43% 49:94% 49:97%
40 1:7053 1:7213 0:94% 49:95% 49:98%
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Figure 3: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontier at three months to maturity with
di⁄erent volatility of cash, ￿x. The pension funding ratio is 0.6. The horizontal dashed
line is the frontier for a unconstrained ￿rm. The dashed curve is the frontier for a
constrained ￿rm with the volatility of cash, ￿x, equals to 0.1. The red solid curve is for
￿x = 0:2. The blue dotted curve is for ￿x = 0:3.
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Table 7: This table shows gains of following a strategy taking into account of the penison
plan underfunding risk with di⁄erent cash volatilities, ￿x. The gain is de￿ned as the
percentage di⁄erence between of two options values: one follows the investment strat-
egy taking into account the pension plan underfunding risk and the other one following
the strategy ignoring the pension plan underfunding risk. Other parameter values are
presented in table 1.
X0 ￿x = 0:3 ￿x = 0:2 ￿x = 0:1
10 0:82% 2:58% 8:6%
15 12:45% 25:98% 103:6%
16 17:96% 49:65% 223:9%
17 18:67% 57:76% 373:7%
18 22:09% 77:89% 317:7%
19 23:62% 71:74% 212:7%
20 24:99% 74:32% 147:4%
40 0:63% 0:53% ￿1:1%
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Table 8: This table shows gains of following a strategy taking into account of the penison
plan underfunding risk with di⁄erent pension plan funding ratio volatilities, ￿f. The
gain is de￿ned as the percentage di⁄erence between of two options values: one follows the
investment strategy taking into account the pension plan underfunding risk and the other
one following the strategy ignoring the pension plan underfunding risk. Other parameter
values are presented in table 1.
￿f = 0:3 ￿f = 0:2 ￿f = 0:1
10 6:69% 2:58% ￿3:17%
15 39:26% 25:98% 25:82%
16 54:56% 49:65% 42:15%
17 75:02% 57:76% 59:42%
18 88:37% 77:89% 70:24%
19 87:01% 71:74% 74:93%
20 79:82% 74:32% 78:53%
40 0:95% 0:53% ￿0:68%
example, when the amount of cash the ￿rm has is 18, the gain is 88%, 78% and 70% if
the funding ratio volatilities are 30%, 20% and 10% respectively.
Figure 5 shows the early exercise frontier with di⁄erent interest rates. The higher the
interest rate, the higher the expected return from both the investment project and the
pension fund. Therefore, higher interest rate leads to higher value of waiting and higher
early exercise threshold value. As can be seen from table 9, the strategy proposed by this
chapter generate higher gains for interest rates equals to 5% and 7% compared with those
for interest rate equal to 3%. For example, when the amount of cash is 15, the gains are
10:64%; 25:98%; and 32:09% for r equals to 3%; 5% and 7% respectively.
Figure 6 shows the early exercise frontier with di⁄erent project value volatilities, ￿v.
The higher the project value volatility, the higher the investment threshold value unless
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Figure 4: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontier at three months to maturity with
di⁄erent pension funding ratio volatilities. The pension funding ratio is 0.6. The hori-
zontal dashed line is the frontier for unconstrained ￿rm. The dashed curve is the frontier
for the constrained ￿rm with the funding ratio volatility, ￿f; equals to 0.1. The red solid
curve is for ￿f = 0:2: The blue dotted curve is for ￿f = 0:3:
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Figure 5: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontier at three months to maturity with
di⁄erent interest rates. The pension funding ratio is 0.6. The horizontal dashed line with
circle is the frontier for unconstrained ￿rm when the interest rate is 7%. The dashed
curve is the frontier for the constrained ￿rm when the interest rate equals to 7%. The
red solid curve with star is for the unconstrained ￿rm when the interest rate is 5%: The
red solid line is the constrained ￿rm when the interest rate is 5%: The blue dashed line
is for the unconstrained ￿rm when the interest rate is 3%: The blue dotted curve is for
the constrained ￿rm when the interest rate is 3%:
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Table 9: This table shows gains of following a strategy taking into account of the penison
plan underfunding risk with di⁄erent interest rates, r. The gain is de￿ned as the percent-
age di⁄erence between of two options values: one follows the investment strategy taking
into account the pension plan underfunding risk and the other one following the strategy
ignoring the pension plan underfunding risk. Other paramter values are presented in
table 1.
r = 0:03 r = 0:05 r = 0:07
10 ￿1:31% 2:58% ￿3:57%
15 10:64% 25:98% 32:09%
16 14:50% 49:65% 45:28%
17 18:69% 57:76% 57:81%
18 20:45% 77:89% 67:36%
19 21:50% 71:74% 57:72%
20 27:44% 74:32% 54:83%
40 0:50% 0:53% ￿1:07%
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Table 10: This table shows gains of following a strategy taking into account of the penison
plan underfunding risk with di⁄erent project value volatilities, ￿v. The gain is de￿ned
as the percentage di⁄erence between of two options values: one follows the investment
strategy taking into account the pension plan underfunding risk and the other one fol-
lowing the strategy ignoring the pension plan underfunding risk. Other parameter values
are presented in table 1.
￿v = 0:3 ￿v = 0:2 ￿v = 0:1
10 1:99% 2:58% ￿17:68%
15 26:31% 25:98% 25:35%
16 38:05% 49:65% 30:70%
17 46:83% 57:76% 43:48%
18 57:48% 77:89% 60:15%
19 60:06% 71:74% 75:46%
20 59:01% 74:32% 77:09%
40 0:94% 0:53% ￿0:09%
the ￿rm￿ s exercise frontier is determined by the borrowing constraint: higher project value
volatility means higher chances to have high project values in the future and, therefore,
leads to higher value of waiting. Table 10 shows the gains of adopting the investment
strategy proposed by this chapter. No matter what the project value volatilities are, the
gains are large. For example, when the amount of cash the ￿rm has is 18, the gains are
57%, 78% and 60% for ￿v = 0:3; 0:2 and 0:1 respectively.
Table 11 shows the option values with underfunded pension plans when the di⁄usion
processes of cash ￿ ow and the investment project value, ￿XV; are either positively (70%)
or negatively (-70%) correlated and the correlation between cash ￿ ow and pension funding
ratio keeps at 0. The investment option values are increasing with ￿XV: For example,
when the initial cash ￿ ow is 15, the option value for a ￿rm where ￿XV is ￿70% is
0.4474. The option value increases to 1.4353 when the correlation increases to 70%.
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Figure 6: This ￿gure shows the early exercise frontier at three months to maturity with
di⁄erent interest rates. The pension funding ratio is 0.6. The horizontal dashed line with
circle is the frontier for unconstrained ￿rm when ￿v = 10%. The dashed curve is the
frontier for the constrained ￿rm when ￿v = 10%. The red solid curve with star is for
the unconstrained ￿rm when ￿v = 20%: The red solid line is the constrained ￿rm when
￿v = 20%: The blue dashed line is for the unconstrained ￿rm when ￿v = 30%: The blue
dotted curve is for the constrained ￿rm when ￿v = 30%:
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Table 11: This table shows the option value with di⁄erent ￿XV. Firm 2 follows the
optimal investment strategy taking into account the pension underfunding risk and ￿rm
1 follows the strategy which is optimal for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm without a pension
plan. The parameter values are presented in table 1. X0 stands for the amount of internal
capital.
Cash Option Value (￿XV = ￿0:7) Option Value (￿XV = 0:7)
X0 Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase
10 0 0 - 0.4088 0.4504 10.18%
15 0.2309 0.4474 93.71% 0.6316 1.4353 127.22%
17 0.3544 0.9954 180.85% 0.6539 1.4182 116.88%
20 0.3010 1.3189 338.17% 1.0747 1.3635 26.87%
The positive correlation means that the investment project value and the cash ￿ ow will
improve together and thus, more chances that the option will be exercised in the future.
Table 12 shows the option value with underfunded pension plans where the correlations
between cash ￿ ow and pension plan funding ratios, ￿XF; are either 70% or -70% and
￿XV keeps at 0. The investment option values are increasing with ￿XF: When ￿XF and
X0 equal to ￿70% and 15 respectively, the investment option value (￿rm 2) is 1.0383.
The investment option value (￿rm 2) increases to 1.2122 when ￿XF equals to 70%: When
the correlation between cash ￿ ow and pension funding ratio is positive, cash in￿ ow and
pension funding ratio improve together which decreases the possibilities that the ￿rm
will be liquidity constrained in the future. Following the strategy taking into account the
correlations lead to large and positive gains for any correlations.
We derived an optimal investment strategy for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm sponsoring
a underfunded DB pension plan. We show that the investment strategy should depends on
the pension plan￿ s funding status. We evaluated the gain of adopting such an investment
strategy by comparing the investment option value of two otherwise identical ￿rms one
follows the strategy proposed by this chapter and one follows the investment strategy
ignoring the pension plan underfunding risk. We ￿nd that adopting the strategy proposed
by this chapter can lead to signi￿cant increases in the investment option value. The result
is robust with respect to changes in parameter values.
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Table 12: This table shows the option value with di⁄erent ￿XF. Firm 2 follows the
optimal investment strategy taking into account the pension underfunding risk and ￿rm
1 follows the strategy which is optimal for a liquidity-constrained ￿rm without a pension
plan. The parameter values are presented in table 1. X0 stands for the amount of internal
capital.
Cash Option Value (￿XF = ￿0:7) Option Value (￿XF = 0:7)
X0 Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase Firm 1 Firm 2 % Increase
10 0.1010 0.1083 7.25% 0.1088 0.1171 7.60%
15 0.7103 1.0383 46.17% 0.8591 1.2122 41.09%
17 0.5215 1.2383 137.43% 0.7881 1.3921 76.63%
20 0.5651 1.3588 140.42% 0.7585 1.3882 83.01%
IV Conclusions
The loss a underfunded pension plan brings to the sponsoring ￿rm is twofold. First, by
law the sponsoring company has to make additional contributions to the pension plan
to close the funding gap. Second, the mandatory contribution depletes the ￿rm￿ s capital
and therefore limits its ability to conduct core business investment. We argue that a
sponsoring ￿rm should adopt an optimal investment strategy which takes into account
the pension underfunding risk.
We show that in a market where borrowing is limited, the ￿rm￿ s optimal investment
strategy depends on the amount of capital available for investment and the initial pension
funding ratio. When the amount of capital for investment is very small, ￿rms with
di⁄erent pension funding ratios have the same investment strategy. At low levels of
capital, the investment strategy is determined by the borrowing constraint. When the
amount of capital for investment is very large, ￿rms do not have liquidity constraint
and therefore follow the same strategy. When a ￿rm is neither extremely constrained nor
unconstrained, the sponsoring ￿rm￿ s investment threshold value for an investment project
decreases when the pension plan funding ratio worsens. This is because ￿rms with lower
pension plan funding ratios have larger expected pension contributions and therefore
lower values of waiting. The result indicates that ￿rms with lower pension funding ratio
should invest earlier than otherwise identical ￿rms with higher pension funding ratio. We
show that the investment option value increases signi￿cantly in response to adopt the
strategy proposed by this chapter.
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Appendix The Early Exercise Frontier
This appendix shows the details of the steps to obtain early exercise frontiers. Let
XT￿￿t = XT￿￿t, FT￿￿t = F T￿￿t, and ^ V 1
T￿￿t be the initial project value, where XT￿￿t
and F T￿￿t can be any elements in the vectors XT￿￿t and FT￿￿t and the initial project
value ^ V 1
T￿￿t is chosen to be equal to the investment cost, I. We ￿rst calculate the value
of waiting, ￿T￿￿t
￿
XT￿￿t; F T￿￿t; ^ V 1
T￿￿t
￿
. From the project value, ^ V 1
T￿￿t, we can ￿nd a
new project value, ^ V 2
T￿￿t, which ful￿lls the following two conditions
^ V
2
T￿￿t (XT￿￿t;FT￿￿t)￿I+XT￿￿t+ET￿￿tAT +GT￿￿t = ￿T￿￿t
￿












where the left side of (10) stands for the value of immediate exercise when the project value
is ^ V 2
T￿￿t (XT￿￿t;FT￿￿t), and the right side of (10) is the option value of waiting when the
project value is ^ V 1
T￿￿t; while (11) requires that the liquidity constraint is ful￿lled. By using
the same steps, starting from project value ^ V 2
T￿￿t we can ￿nd a new project value, ^ V 3
T￿￿t:
We will repeat the same procedure many times until the project value converges, that is,
the di⁄erence between the outcomes of two simulations is very small,
￿ ￿ ￿^ V
n+1
T￿￿t ￿ ^ V n
T￿￿t
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿;
￿ = 0:0001: ^ V n
T￿￿t is the investment threshold at time T ￿ ￿t when the value of liquid
assets is XT￿￿t and the funding ratio is F T￿￿t: We calculate the corresponding invest-












we then estimate a function, FT￿￿t (XT￿￿t; FT￿￿t), which rep-
resents the early exercise frontier at time T ￿￿t: FT￿￿t (XT￿￿t; FT￿￿t) is estimated by
regressing ^ VT￿￿t on polynomials in X0
T￿￿ts and F 0
T￿￿ts: After obtaining the parameter-
ized exercise frontier at time T ￿ ￿t, we proceed backwards using the same procedure.
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